Balancing Act: Ensuring the National Guard Can Meet Its Missions

Taren Dillon Sylvester is a research assistant for the National Security Human Capital Program at the Center for a New American Security.

In February 2025, New York Governor Kathy Hochul deployed members of the National Guard to staff state prisons in response to an ongoing strike by corrections officers. Critics of this order claim that the safety of Guardsmen was at risk because the National Guard is not trained in corrections. In the past five years, National Guard troops across the country have been asked to act as schoolteachers, monitor mass transit, and enforce border security—all skills that lie outside their traditional mission sets. While governors have the authority to enact these orders, such deployments can be detrimental to the readiness of the National Guard for federal missions under the command of the governor (Title 32) or under the command of the U.S. president (Title 10). To preserve Guard readiness for critical missions, governors should adopt policies that reduce reliance on the National Guard in nontraditional capacities.

In April 2024, several retired National Guard generals argued that the expanded mission sets of Guard units operating in State Active Duty status, especially when participating in nontraditional missions, impacts readiness for both those individual units and the Joint Force as a whole. At the federal level, the National Guard is a critical component of the U.S. military, supporting a variety of functions for the Army and Air Force when operating in Title 10 status. With continued integration of the Reserve components of the Department of Defense’s Total Force Policy, the National Guard serves as an operational reserve and deploys together with active-duty forces on missions across the globe. While much of the Guard’s mission supports State Active Duty and Title 32 missions, the potential for Title 10 missions requires that Guard training meet the standards for federal operations.

At the state level, whether operating in State Active Duty or under Title 32, the National Guard plays an important role in maintaining security within the state and territory. In recent years, the pace of domestic activations of Guard units has increased, including domestic responses to civil unrest in cities across the country, supporting local law enforcement in Washington, D.C., during the January 6, 2021, Capitol insurrection, and in response to natural and manmade disasters. National Guard units in many states also faced a host of challenging tasks related to the COVID-19 pandemic emergency, including patient care, transport, and housekeeping in hospitals.

The National Guard is a pivotal component of the Joint Force and was instrumental to operations in post-9/11 conflicts. Throughout the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Army National Guard troops deployed in concert with active-duty and Reserve units, fulfilling duties including a full range of combat and security force operations, regional missions, partner training and advisory missions, and local reconstruction. More than 300,000 National Guard troops deployed throughout the war in Iraq. The Air National Guard (ANG) provided logistics support and coordination on the ground in Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom from its inception in March 2003. The ANG’s airlift capabilities were further critical in the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the evacuation of U.S. civilians and military personnel from Kabul in 2021.

The 2022 National Defense Strategy outlines building a resilient, integrated Joint Force as a key defense priority. In pursuit of this and other stated security objectives, the United States will continue to rely on capabilities nested in the National Guard. Significant combat communications, logistics, and evacuation functions depend on ANG units, without which operations would be at a standstill. Recent changes to the Army’s force design aimed at modernization and greater efficiency across warfighting domains are intended to facilitate better integration of service components.

However, most federal planning measures neglect the additional state mission sets that rely on the same pool of National Guard units. Similarly, frequent use of the National Guard in a State Active Duty capacity increases the personnel and operational tempo for some units, contributing to service-member stress and straining the capabilities of critical mission support and logistics systems housed within the Guard. Given the necessary functions that the National Guard provides to the readiness and resilience of the total force, this is concerning for three reasons.

First, increased active use of the National Guard in State Active Duty status limits the time service members can spend drilling. Given the expanding scope of missions Guardsmen are asked to tackle, there is no way they can effectively train to meet expanding State Active Duty mission requirements. A lack of proper training can result in dangerous situations when Guard troops are inadequately prepared, particularly in missions that involve supporting law enforcement or correctional officers. These roles have procedures and rules for the use of force that are distinct from the rules of engagement under which the military operates for missions conducted abroad, and that differ based on agency and locality. Guardsmen in New York activated to state prisons during the corrections officers’ strike received minimal, on-the-job training in detention centers where they worked 12- to 14-hour days in conditions worse than some experienced in Afghanistan. Critics raised concerns that using undertrained Guardsmen in a corrections capacity could escalate existing tensions between inmates and prison guards, putting all parties at greater risk of violence.

Second, the use of military forces for domestic operations is a contentious subject among the public. In recent years there has been a decline in Americans’ trust in public institutions across the whole of government. While the military remains among the most trusted, there has been a noticeable decline: only 43 percent of young adults have a positive view of the military. Additionally, Americans have a strong preference against uniformed military intervention in traditional law enforcement activities. While there are indications that the public is more comfortable with National Guardsmen than with active-duty troops in this role, Americans prefer conventional police forces to handle instances of civil unrest. Governors should take this into careful consideration when deciding to deploy Guardsmen for such missions.

Finally, the Trump administration has indicated that defense priorities are shifting to focus military operations at the southern U.S. border, aligning more aggressively with defense priorities outlined in Pillar I of the 2017 National Security Strategy. Troop commitments announced on March 1, 2025, including two National Guard brigades, are likely the first in a series of Guard activations for Title 10 missions. Such requirements will further stress the Guard’s operational tempo.

Governors should be conscious of the increased frequency of unexpected events, such as natural disasters, and should prioritize reserving the use of National Guard forces for sudden emergencies. They should exercise restraint, especially in response to civil unrest related to First Amendment protected protests, to preserve the readiness of Guard forces. Governors should strengthen relationships with federal law enforcement agencies and limit the use of the National Guard for State Active Duty logistics and supply missions as much as possible.

State legislatures also have an important role in regulating the use of the National Guard by passing laws that constrain how and when a governor can activate Guard units. State legislatures should enact laws limiting the functions permitted during State Active Duty, while providing necessary flexibility for escalation to Title 32 functions when appropriate. Governors and state legislatures should collaborate to ensure adequate funding and staffing in critical areas where Guard troops are being tasked to cover gaps.

There will always be unexpected emergencies for which the National Guard is prepared to act. However, overreliance on this emergency resource to fill state policy shortfalls will exhaust this critical reserve force. Overutilizing the National Guard not only weakens the resources available to a governor in a true emergency but impacts national security at the federal level. Further, the National Guard is not trained or equipped to meet every challenge. Assigning Guardsmen to operate in capacities outside their area of expertise or authority can jeopardize the safety of both service members and civilians through misadventure, negligence, or outright hostility. While the National Guard is an important asset in all duty statuses (State Active Duty, Title 32, and Title 10), it is important to ensure that it is the right tool for the job at hand.

About the Commentary Series

In February 2024, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) launched a project on federalism and national security. This portfolio has taken shape under the CNAS Securing U.S. Democracy Initiative. Recognizing that the 21st-century United States increasingly relies on its system of federalism to rebalance the centers of power and authority across a range of public policy issues, the Securing Democracy Initiative has developed a body of work focused on states’ authorities, roles, and responsibilities that relate to national security functions. Increasing reliance on the U.S. federalist system of government presents both challenges and opportunities for strengthening national security. This commentary series and the December 2024 report Stress Testing State Power: When Governors and Presidents Diverge on Matters of National Security are components of this research effort.

Each commentary in this series explores a current trend or dynamic in modern uses and authorities of the National Guard. Expert authors explore how the Guard is currently being used and will be increasingly called upon in years ahead. Authors provide recommendations for modernizing and clarifying legal authorities for National Guard deployment, and for legislative action at the state and federal levels.

The CNAS project on federalism and national security is made possible with the generous support of the Democracy Innovation Fund, Defending Democracy Together Institute. As a research and policy institution committed to the highest standards of organizational, intellectual, and personal integrity, CNAS maintains strict intellectual independence and sole editorial direction and control over its ideas, projects, publications, events, and other research activities. CNAS does not take institutional positions on policy issues, and the content of CNAS publications reflects the views of their authors alone. In keeping with its mission and values, CNAS does not engage in lobbying activity and complies fully with all applicable federal, state, and local laws. CNAS will not engage in any representational activities or advocacy on behalf of any entities or interests and, to the extent that the Center accepts funding from non-U.S. sources, its activities will be limited to bona fide scholastic, academic, and research-related activities, consistent with applicable federal law. The Center publicly acknowledges on its website annually all donors who contribute.