September 25, 2024
Do ‘good rebels’ exist in Myanmar?
Myanmar is experiencing unprecedented levels of conflict between the military junta, or Tatmadaw, and increasingly collaborative ethnic armed organisations (EAOs). In the past year, various EAOs’ territorial and political successes have wrested more than 86% of the country’s territory from junta control, fuelling optimism that the Tatmadaw’s fall to the Spring Revolution – as the opposition to the 2021 military coup d’état is known locally – is imminent.
Yet, evidence shows that many of Myanmar’s EAOs have also committed gross in bello contraventions of international law. To engage the country responsibly in a post-junta context, international stakeholders must avoid falling into familiar archetypal characterisations of the EAOs as “good rebels”, and appreciate the nuance of each EAO’s unique history, cultural identity, and ideological goals.
In October 2023, with the junta facing large-scale defection and substantial setbacks, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) – composed of the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) – launched Operation 1027. The operation’s “stunning gains” reenergised the National Unity Government (NUG), which now operates in exile. By February, the NUG declared its intention to collaborate with 3BHA and credited the operation with creating the conditions for a post-coup governance plan.
In protracted conflict scenarios like Myanmar, no party is ever wholly innocent.
The junta failed to sufficiently mobilise a response to Operation 1027. Its increased use of airstrikes has not weakened the Spring Revolution, and has instead driven up severe humanitarian needs and led to credible allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Some 2.7 million people in Myanmar are displaced due to armed conflict and 15 million suffer food insecurity. The ongoing effects of Typhoon Yagi, which left more than 470 people dead or missing earlier this month, and affected up to 887,000, will only exacerbate Myanmar’s dire humanitarian vulnerabilities.
Between 2023 and the end of August 2024 – the “period of analysis” for the purposes of this analysis – military forces executed 622 airstrikes on civilian targets, leaving 1,220 dead, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), whose data is used throughout this article to track civilian targeting. Most attacks occurred in Rakhine State, the homeland of the Muslim minority Rohingya. The Tatmadaw systematically targets Rohingya, notably including a mass purge in 2017 that forms the merits of an ongoing International Court of Justice case accusing the junta of violating the Genocide Convention. Last week, the UN condemned “gross violations of human rights” by the junta, and renewed its recommendation that the Security Council refer the situation to the International Criminal Court.
Read the full article from The New Humanitarian.
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