October 29, 2018
How to tell if North Korea is serious about denuclearization
Since the Singapore summit between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in June, Pyongyang has made gestures and statements suggesting that it will curtail its nuclear-missile programs. However, in the absence of a nuclear deal between Washington and Pyongyang, the North’s nuclear arsenal continues to expand, and the regime continues to violate UN Security Council Resolutions that prohibit nuclear and missile-related activities.
With preparations for a second Trump-Kim summit underway, how should the international community determine what initial denuclearization steps really count? As Washington and Seoul engage with North Korea diplomatically, they have a rare opportunity to persuade the regime that surrendering its nuclear weapons and programs will in fact lead to a brighter future and eventual peace on the Korean Peninsula. But observers need to distinguish steps that are symbolic at best from those that demonstrate Pyongyang’s seriousness. Grabbing hold of whatever Pyongyang offers indiscriminately will only weaken Washington’s future negotiating position.
Before deciding what does constitute a meaningful or serious offer from North Korea, it is helpful to consider what does not. The broad targets of North Korea’s denuclearization should include: the regime’s fissile and thermonuclear material production programs, its nuclear weaponization program, its nuclear weapons and related missiles and other delivery systems, its proliferation programs, and its illicit trade and smuggling networks. Each element is comprised of various facilities, materials, and technologies. With that level of complexity, North Korea could divide each target into multiple steps to offer as bargaining chips, a tactic known as “salami slicing.” And while some initial steps in isolation may be noteworthy or even meaningful, they could actually become relatively meaningless depending on the context.
Read the full article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
More from CNAS
-
Obama tried to pivot to Asia in 2011. We must succeed this time.
This article, originally published in The Washington Post, is an excerpt from Lost Decade: The US Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power. In 2011, President Barack Obama ...
By Richard Fontaine & Robert Blackwill
-
Next UN Afghanistan Talks in Doha Must Hold Taliban to Account on Human Rights
The United Nations is preparing to host its third meeting of international envoys to Afghanistan in Doha later this month. This is a promising initiative aimed at developing a...
By Lisa Curtis
-
How The U.S. Failed To Meet the China Challenge
It’s a rare subject of bipartisan agreement that China is the greatest strategic challenge facing the U.S., perhaps the greatest it has ever faced. And yet, despite a decade o...
By Richard Fontaine & Robert Blackwill
-
Addressing a Human Rights and Looming Terrorism Crisis in Afghanistan
Executive Summary Pursuing the same harsh policies as it did during its previous stint in power in the 1990s, the Taliban has increasingly clamped down on the rights of women...
By Lisa Curtis & Annie Pforzheimer