October 30, 2014
Superiority at any Price? Political Consequences of the First Offset Strategy
Military strategies serve political ends. Judgments about their effectiveness cannot be separated from the historical and geopolitical context in which they exist. The first U.S. offset strategy met the demands of strategic competition, but in its political context, failed in crucial respects. Any attempt to replicate this past “success” is therefore potentially valuable, but also fraught with hazard. Given the emerging trends in the global security environment, it makes eminent sense that the United States seek ways to offset its strategic vulnerabilities. In so doing though, it must be honest about what did not work in offset strategies past.
Read the full piece at War on the Rocks.
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