Democracy in South Asia amid U.S. Aid Cuts

The Trump administration’s drastic cuts to U.S. foreign assistance programs that promote democracy, human rights, and transparent economic development will undermine U.S. global influence and power and provide opportunities for the PRC to bolster its sway and advance autocratic trends in vulnerable nations. China will use its development aid and loans to promote autocracy in countries where U.S. aid and presence is absent, and the United States will lose the ability to partner with nations in service of its core national security goals. If vulnerable nations no longer receive U.S. assistance that helps them meet economic objectives and fosters democratic development of their societies, they will become fertile ground for opposition to U.S. values and interests, thereby threatening U.S. national security.

The future of democracy in South Asia impacts great power competition between the United States and China. Half the global population that went to the polls in 2024 resides in South Asia.² The leading democracy in the region, India, is a critical strategic partner of the United States and on the front lines of countering rising Chinese political, economic, and military influence. To compete effectively with China in South Asia, the United States should:

Establish a coordinator for countering foreign propaganda in the White House to lead interagency efforts to combat PRC propaganda. Putting a senior White House official in charge of interagency coordination of U.S. efforts to combat propaganda would overcome the shortcomings of the previous State Department Global Engagement Center, which was criticized by Congress for being unable to authoritatively coordinate and direct the interagency and eliminated by the Trump administration on April 16, 2025.³

Revive the Blue Dot Network. This was a signature initiative of the first Trump administration aimed at reducing China’s ability to corrupt foreign leaders by offering large loans for financially unsustainable infrastructure projects. The first Trump administration launched the Blue Dot Network, with the Japanese and Australian governments, to assist countries in determining whether proposed infrastructure projects were commercially viable and sustainable.⁴

Engage Asian donors to broaden assistance to democratic governance. Democratic powerhouses in the Indo-Pacific, such as Japan and South Korea, have long provided foreign assistance to countries in South Asia. However, such assistance has been largely limited to bilateral agreements through government entities and focused on economic development and infrastructure. In recent years, the National Endowment for Democracy and others have raised awareness and created momentum with Asian donors to broaden that support to democratic institutions, civil society, and prodemocracy actors, given rising threats from external illiberal influences.⁵ In line with the Trump administration’s goals to burden share and to have more Asian democracies supporting democracy in Asia, senior-level engagement with the foreign affairs ministries and their development arms in both Japan and South Korea could reap significant dividends.

Continue to fund and support legitimate investigative journalists and media outlets to promote press freedom. Access to legitimate, independent journalism is a core tenet of democratic governance, and access to local media sources has been directly tied to voter turnout.⁶

Tackle foreign propaganda by funding media literacy courses. The United States should reinstate funding for media literacy efforts across South Asia to equip citizens with the skills needed to identify false narratives, fight cognitive or confirmation biases, and empower them to participate in the democratic process. Funding this critical skill set across South Asia, as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) previously did, helps ensure continued democratic development over the long term.

Expand support for election integrity in South Asia to encourage regional stability. As elections in 2024 demonstrated, particularly in countries like Bangladesh, upholding the integrity of free and fair elections is critical to preserving stability in the region. The United States should reinstate funding for programs that enhance electoral transparency, accountability, and voter education across the region. These efforts will not only enhance democratic resilience but also contribute to long-term stability in South Asia.

Sustain visa restrictions on individuals and groups who undermine democracy, focusing immediately on Bangladesh ahead of upcoming elections. Continuing these restrictions demonstrates a sustained U.S. policy approach that prioritizes support for democratic processes and institutions. By extending visa restrictions on specific Bangladeshi individuals ahead of Bangladesh’s elections, set to take place later in 2025 or early 2026, Washington would send a consistent message of support for democracy in the country while maintaining a balanced stance toward all political factions.

Foster inclusive political participation for women, youth, and minority groups across the region. To overcome the barriers to political participation in the region that women, youth, and minority groups face, U.S. assistance programs that address these structural challenges must continue. Additionally, Washington should reinstate USAID programs that focus on legislative strengthening, civic engagement, and leadership training.

Support women in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s severe repression of women strengthens its totalitarian grip on the entire Afghan population and feeds extremism in a country and region where dozens of international terrorist groups already operate.⁷ It is in the U.S. national security interest to support educational opportunities, such as online learning or scholarships to study abroad, for Afghan women and girls.

Support the roadmap for engaging the Taliban and encouraging an inclusive political process from the 2023 United Nations Security Council independent assessment on Afghanistan. The United Nations (UN) Security Council’s independent assessment on Afghanistan, published in late 2023, lays out a coherent roadmap for engaging the Taliban and encouraging an inclusive political process.⁸ The United States should press UN agencies to structure a process of engagement for Afghan citizens, inside and outside the country, to establish an agenda for, and participate in, a process that encourages a sustainable and representative political dispensation in the country.

Introduction

The practice of holding regular national elections has become widespread around the globe. In 2024 alone, 70 nations held major elections.¹⁰ Still, there are concerns about overall democratic backsliding and a drift toward authoritarianism in several nations, a trend that has been occurring for nearly two decades.¹¹ It has become increasingly clear that elections alone are not strong indicators of the effectiveness of democratic governance in any given country.

Half of the 3.7 billion people that went to the polls in 2024 were in South Asia. While overall participation in South Asia’s elections in 2024 was relatively high, the degree to which the elections were credible, transparent, and participatory varied considerably. In fact, the January 2024 election in Bangladesh that reelected former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to power was so flawed by violence and the absence of opposition participation that it later sparked widespread student protests that forced her to flee the country and led to the installation of an interim technocratic government. Similarly, Pakistan’s parliamentary elections were marred by widespread allegations of fraud by the military.¹²

The United States’ national security and economic interests are generally better served when countries practice democratic governance, which helps ensure that governments remain accountable to the people they serve and societies develop more peacefully and prosperously, while individual liberty and freedoms are protected. Authoritarian regimes and, to some extent, even illiberal democracies create environments that are rife with corruption and impunity, undermine the rule of law, trample on human rights, and lead to extremism and conflict—all of which can threaten global security and economic wellbeing. In the 20th century, the United States’ two biggest foes, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, were both undemocratic countries.

Supporting democracy overseas has been an integral aspect of U.S. foreign policy for decades.¹³ Even the American founding fathers acknowledged the need to incorporate American democratic ideals into a “prudent” foreign policy that would prevent the dominance of one country on the European continent.¹⁴ In a 1983 speech at Westminster, former President Ronald Reagan emphasized the need to foster democratic systems abroad and established the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a private nonprofit foundation funded through annual U.S. congressional appropriations.¹⁵ Dr. Matthew Spaulding, Kirby professor in constitutional government at Hillsdale College and the dean of the Van Andel Graduate School of Government at Hillsdale College’s Washington, D.C., campus, has said that promoting freedom abroad “has been and should always be a predominant theme of American foreign policy.”¹⁶

Following attacks on the United States by Islamist terrorists on September 11, 2001, the Bush administration focused on promoting the principles of liberal democratic governance, including individual liberty and religious freedom, to fight Islamist ideologues that relied on intolerance and repression to gain power. This policy not only helped secure freedom for others but also protected U.S. national security by combating support for Islamist extremism that fosters global terrorism. The safety of Americans at home since 2001 should not be taken lightly as an achievement.

More recently, promoting democratic systems of governance overseas and providing foreign assistance that fosters transparent economic development have become important tools in the U.S. strategy to compete with growing People’s Republic of China (PRC) influence. During the last decade, the PRC has promoted its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to build transportation and digital infrastructure across the world. In addition to providing an outlet for its excess industrial capacity and putting China at the center of global trading routes, the BRI helps the PRC achieve strategic objectives, in part by offering a development model rife with corruption and opacity that moves countries away from liberal democratic standards.¹⁷

The United States has created mechanisms that push back on the PRC’s BRI strategy. For instance, in 2018 the U.S. Congress passed the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act that established the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). The purpose behind the establishment of the DFC was to better leverage private capital for overseas investments in infrastructure projects. The DFC’s portfolio is currently about $40 billion across 100 countries. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a U.S. organization established in 2004 in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, provides international assistance that facilitates sustainable economic development and reduces poverty. The corporation’s budget request for fiscal year (FY) 2025 was $937 million.¹⁸ The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) managed a budget of over $35 billion for FY 2024, which included funding for programs to alleviate poverty, combat hunger, provide shelter, fight disease, expand education, and promote good governance.¹⁹

The United States has recently embarked on a course of action with significant geopolitical risks, which includes weakening democracy across the globe. On January 20, 2025, the Trump administration issued an executive order that suspended all U.S. foreign aid for a 90-day period, allegedly to allow the administration time to review the programs and ensure they aligned with the Trump administration’s priorities.²⁰ However, the review has turned into a dismantling of the organization: The USAID headquarters has been closed, thousands of employees have been terminated and put on administrative leave, and 90 percent of USAID contracts or grants have been cancelled.²¹ Trump’s then–acting USAID deputy administrator, Pete Marocco, testified to Washington’s district court on February 18, 2025, that USAID contracts or grants related to “democracy promotion” or “civic society” are being terminated.²² Additionally, the Trump administration announced the pending closure and disestablishment of the MCC on April 23, 2025.²³

To address the national security implications to ending U.S. support for democratic values overseas, this paper will first evaluate some of the major political trends in the South Asia region in the last several years that affect the quality of democracy and civil liberties, including freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and due process of law. It will then provide a survey of each South Asian country, including information about the circumstances and context of each nation’s democratic development, as well as their varied levels of protections for individual and civil liberties. Next, the paper will examine the implications of democratic trends in the region for great power competition. The final section provides a series of U.S. policy recommendations to support continued democratic development in South Asia to manage U.S. great power competition with China, while avoiding the deficiencies and excesses that occurred in some cases of previous U.S. aid programs and approaches.