Global Swing States and the New Great Power Competition

Introduction

Global politics today is more contested, confrontational, and uncertain than at any time since the end of the Cold War. China seeks domination in Asia and beyond, while Russia remains aggressively revisionist in Europe. Both are working with Iran and North Korea in an “axis of upheaval” to resist a Western-dominated world.⁴ Key U.S. allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific are growing stronger and more unified, but each has doubts about the future—and about America’s own trajectory. Policymakers in Washington today represent a mix of those who see the rules-based international order as key to U.S. security, prosperity, and liberty, and others who argue that any such order exists only to enrich other countries at America’s expense.

Washington itself is pursuing a form of upheaval. In its first 100 days, the current administration threatened to seize foreign territory, imposed trade barriers on the entire world simultaneously, downplayed the role of democracy and human rights, and hinted at accepting spheres of influence in Eurasia. Whether this pattern will endure remains uncertain. Yet U.S. overtures—to reset relations with Russia, for instance, or perhaps to reach a grand bargain with China—are exceedingly unlikely to succeed in forging a new relationship with either country. Nor will radical revisions to international order serve American interests better than the existing system, which largely reflects U.S. preferences.

While President Donald Trump’s administration is skeptical about the existing order, the axis countries are outright opposed to it. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea share the goal of overturning the principles, rules, and institutions that underlie the prevailing international system.⁵ These countries chafe at a world that they believe does not recognize their natural spheres of influence, the legitimacy of their autocratic systems, or their status and power. They are determined to create an alternative to an international order they consider to be dominated by the United States.⁶ As a result, the long-run competition between the United States and its allies on the one hand, and a revisionist axis of upheaval on the other, will largely represent a contest over the shape of international order.

While conceptions of international order are often broad and even vague, five key pillars are specific and concrete. The territorial order aims to protect national sovereignty and discourage wars of conquest. The global trade order aims to regularize an open international trading system in which prosperity can increase. The financial order aims to facilitate international trade and investment, promote monetary stability, and avoid crises. The nonproliferation order attempts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. The human rights order seeks to preserve the basic rights and liberties of individuals everywhere.

Despite the many doubts, including in the current U.S. administration, the United States benefits from, and has a vital interest in maintaining, a global order governed by rules rather than brute power, one in which countries enjoy sovereignty, disputes are resolved peacefully, markets are open to trade, human rights are considered universal, and democracy can flourish. Since the 1940s, Washington has opposed hostile spheres of influence, especially in Eurasia, precisely because they threaten the United States’ desired rules-based order.⁷ The current order has downsides, to be sure, and it has produced discontent among populations and policymakers. Yet the rules-based international order is also a bit like democracy: the worst system except for all the others.

Because the core pillars of the international order enhance the security, prosperity, and freedom of Americans, the overarching goal of U.S. policy should be to preserve them even as specific rules and institutions change and adapt. This objective yields two tasks: first, to reform the pillars—their rules and institutions—to advance U.S. interests and values; second, to create incentives for pivotal countries to embrace the pillars. This report is focused largely on the latter, while recognizing the interplay between the two.

Policymakers should focus on six global swing states—Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Türkiye—that together will exert disproportionate influence over the future of international order. Each of the six is multi-aligned, maintaining simultaneous ties with the United States, Russia, and China. None wishes to be forced into a strategic alignment with one great power alone, and all seek meaningful changes in international rules and institutions. Each of the global swing states plays a dominant role in its region and takes actions with worldwide repercussions. They possess sufficient collective geopolitical weight for their policy preferences to sway the future direction of the international order.

The United States should prioritize these countries in its foreign policy. It should encourage swing state governments to choose policies that reflect the core principles of international order, and it should work to deny advantages to the axis states. That, in turn, requires dealing with each not simply as a pawn in great power competition but as an important country in its own right, with interests and activities that may differ from, but that can ultimately align with, those of the United States. Washington should work with all six on issues such as military basing, digital infrastructure, trade arrangements, global norms, and the future of international institutions.

This report offers a path for engaging with global swing states toward a vision of world order favorable to U.S. interests. It builds on the original 2012 Center for a New American Security (CNAS) report that highlighted four of the current six countries, arguing that a U.S. focus on Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Türkiye could deliver a large geopolitical payoff.⁸ The list now has expanded to include Saudi Arabia and South Africa, given their increased economic and diplomatic heft. International competition today is far more acute than 13 years ago, the shape of international order much more contested, the U.S. role more uncertain, the stakes even higher, and, as a result, the potential role of global swing states in the outcome even greater.