Regional and Global Responses to a Taiwan Contingency

The third group includes the other states in Southeast Asia. Thailand and Singapore would have to consider their defense ties to Washington, while Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar might get requests from Beijing. Other Southeast Asian states would adopt a studiously neutral stance. The fourth group is Europe and the rest of the world. European states now pay more attention to Taiwan, and many see parallels with Ukraine’s plight. But uneven ties with China and a lack of power projection capabilities would mostly limit direct European intervention. Meanwhile, the developing world would likely side with Beijing. And it lacks the political will—much less the proximity or military power—to come to Taipei’s aid.

Several findings flow from the analysis: First, it is unlikely that any other states will come to Taiwan’s aid if Taiwan does not fight fiercely and the United States does not intervene on a large scale. Second, geographic proximity increases a country’s stake in the defense of Taiwan, but that same closeness also makes countries more vulnerable to PRC retaliation. Third, any Taiwan contingency would cause massive economic harm, so states would try to balance protecting their economic interests—especially access to high-end semiconductors—with ending the conflict just to stem the disruption caused by the fighting. Fourth, states’ choices will reflect their national interests and values, but those responses will depend to a significant degree on what others do.

U.S. policymakers should take the following actions to best position Washington to mount an effective coalition defense of Taiwan during a contingency, should those policymakers choose to do so:

• Prioritize preventing a Taiwan contingency.
• Reinforce with Taipei how much would hinge on Taiwan’s contingency response, both in terms of demonstrating will and capabilities.
• Expect limited contributions but be creative in exploring what in the spectrum of intervention might be possible.
• Deepen intra-Asian and Euro-Asian security ties that include the United States.
• Support and, where possible, facilitate the growth of intra-Asian security ties that do not rely on the United States as the hub.
• Plan for humanitarian evacuation operations as a means to encourage Southeast Asian countries to think through a Taiwan contingency.

Introduction

A contingency across the Taiwan Strait has the potential to reshape the Indo-Pacific and even global security environment. That possibility has prompted numerous analyses of how Taiwan (officially, the Republic of China or ROC) and the United States might respond to aggression from China (officially, the People’s Republic of China or PRC). The ways other states in the Indo- Pacific region and beyond might respond, however, have received considerably less attention and would be a critical factor shaping any cross-Strait contingency.

This report explores how those other states might respond to a Taiwan contingency.¹ Specifically, it examines how geopolitical interests, values, and material power might determine the approaches of countries across the region and the world. This analysis employs an approach with three defining characteristics. First, it charts a middle path between two analytic extremes: either saying “it depends” due to the myriad variables that would influence Taiwan contingency responses, or the false certainty of offering highly detailed forecasts based on just one possible scenario. Second, the report is deliberately concise, highlighting only the central actors and the critical factors shaping their behavior. Third, the text focuses on what the authors call a major Taiwan contingency, meaning a conflict that might start in the so-called gray zone between peace and war but clearly escalates into a larger campaign that has unification as Beijing’s near-term objective.²

The report proceeds as follows. It starts by exploring key structural factors that would shape states’ responses to Taiwan contingencies. Next, it examines the contours and determinants of how four key groups of states might respond to a Taiwan contingency. The four groups are the geographic frontline states of Japan and the Philippines; close U.S. allies and partners South Korea (officially, the Republic of Korea or ROK), Australia, and India; Southeast Asian states (other than the Philippines); and the rest of the world, including Europe and the developing world. The report concludes by detailing findings and recommendations for policymakers in Washington as well as like-minded capitals.