November 05, 2025

Democracy in Africa and U.S. Policy

The Cases of Mozambique and Tanzania

By: Richard Fontaine and Gibbs McKinley

Introduction

Freedom declined globally for the 19th consecutive year in 2024, including on the African continent. A host of countries in Africa have seen more political unrest, violent extremism, and democratic reversals since 2020 than in any other region. Democratic erosion is a net loss, both for citizens deprived of basic rights and for the United States’ position in an increasingly unstable world. America’s most reliable trade and investment markets are those in liberal societies, as are its closest security partners.

Although other regions dominate headlines—from wars in the Middle East and Europe to the challenge of China in the Indo-Pacific, America’s priority region—the future of democracy will be written to a significant extent in Africa. The United States remains a global actor, with interests and commitments in many places. As such, it requires a foreign policy strategy that reflects that reality, including across Africa, where Russia and China have been gaining footholds for decades.

Although other regions dominate headlines, the future of democracy will be written to a significant extent in Africa.

By supporting democracy, governance, and the rule of law across Africa, the United States—in addition to adhering to its founding values—can better shape a more stable environment in a region ripe for mutually beneficial relations. Stronger ties to key African countries come with opportunities offered by young, growing populations; increasingly advanced economies; and critical resources that will influence the competition between the United States and its adversaries. More democratic governance that is responsive to citizens’ needs is critical to the success of current U.S. trade and investment projects and proposals across Africa. As a result, encouraging such governance serves American interests—and sets U.S. engagement apart from China’s exploitative practices.

Mozambique and Tanzania present useful case studies of the effects of democratic erosion, the impact that U.S. policy might have on governance and stability in pivotal countries, and potential avenues for U.S. engagement across Africa. This policy brief draws on research trips to each country; dozens of meetings with government officials, journalists, experts, and others; and an examination of existing U.S. policy. It assesses the general condition of governance and human rights in Mozambique and Tanzania and recommends approaches for U.S. engagement with each.

Mozambique

Despite transitioning to multiparty democracy in 1990, the ruling party—the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)—has held power continuously since before the country’s first multiparty elections in 1994. The Freedom in the World 2024 report labels Mozambique as only “partly free,” with elections in 2023 marred by irregularities and violent crackdowns on opposition protests. The country’s most recent general elections, which took place in October 2024, drew serious concerns from EU observers. Though FRELIMO’s win was upheld by the Constitutional Court amid nationwide protests, the process was tainted by voter fraud and intimidation, and International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance identifies Mozambique’s lack of credible elections as a primary driver of the country’s democratic decline.

Washington’s policy toward Mozambique has traditionally focused on development, counterterrorism, and economic engagement. The United States is the largest bilateral donor to the country and, as of 2023, provided over $560 million annually in assistance. That same year, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) signed a separate compact with Mozambique worth over $500 million. In September 2024, the U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa, participated in a military exchange with the Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique to highlight shared interests in promoting peace and stability in southern Africa.

U.S. interests in diversifying and increasing its supplies of critical minerals and liquefied natural gas (LNG) have elevated opportunities for cooperation with Mozambique and reaffirmed the importance of a stable region. The country has the potential to become a leading producer of natural gas, and its resource wealth includes iron ore, gold, gemstones, and mineral tantalite. Positioned strategically along a vital global maritime route, Mozambique is also a critical corridor for transporting key resources.

Political instability and domestic insurgency have, however, threatened U.S. interests in the country. When the port of Maputo—a hub for chromium exports—closed during violent post-election protests in late 2024, global shipments were disrupted, including those to the United States. The United States wholly relies on imports of graphite and has turned to Mozambique to diversify its supply away from China, another major exporter. Yet political unrest hampered Mozambique’s ability to produce the mineral, which is used in lithium-ion batteries, mobile phones, nuclear reactors, and electric vehicles.

The Freedom in the World 2024 report labels Mozambique as only “partly free,” with elections in 2023 marred by irregularities and violent crackdowns on opposition protests.

The government, backed by Rwandan military units and an EU training mission, is also battling an Islamist insurgency in the northern Cabo Delgado region. Unrest there has played a large part in preventing the development of LNG projects off the northern coast of Mozambique. Though the U.S. Export-Import (EXIM) Bank approved a $4.7 billion loan for Area 1 LNG—first in 2020 and reauthorized in March 2025—security risks in Cabo Delgado have repeatedly delayed the project. The insurgency preys on vulnerable, underemployed youth populations in the region. Fostering a more stable region will rest in large part on providing opportunity and a voice for this group; more responsive, democratic governance would represent a step in the right direction.

The United States also competes with China for influence in Mozambique. As a revolutionary party, FRELIMO looks to Beijing as a model and seeks to emulate at least some aspects of its political system. In 2022, 55 percent of Mozambicans surveyed had a positive perception of Chinese influence in their country, compared with only 47 percent who said that U.S. influence was a good thing. Bilateral trade between China and Mozambique reached $5.21 billion in 2024, and the country—like all African countries with which China has diplomatic relations—receives zero-tariff treatment on 100 percent of taxable products exported to China. This stands in stark contrast to the new, 15 percent tariff rate imposed on Mozambique by the United States in July 2025.

Tanzania

Tanzania has also been ruled by one political party—Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM, or the Party of the Revolution)—since it gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1961. Despite the establishment of an ostensibly multiparty system in 1992 and optimism in the 2010s for improved democratization, Tanzania subsequently experienced an authoritarian winter. Restrictions on civil society increased and elections in 2020 were met with high levels of violent oppression.

Some hope was revived after John Magufuli, Tanzania’s increasingly heavy-handed president, died in 2021. Samia Suluhu Hassan, previously Tanzania’s vice president, assumed the presidency in March 2021 and reversed some of her predecessor’s authoritarian policies, allowing public rallies to recommence, relaxing media restrictions, and working with opposition parties on reforms. As the October 2025 elections approached, however, the government arrested the opposition leader, banned his party, and cracked down on media freedom. It barred the main opposition party, Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA), from running in the election and excluded observers from regional blocs like the East African Community (EAC) and Southern African Development Community (SADC).

Washington continues to value Tanzania’s role as a stabilizing force in East Africa, a founding member of the EAC, a member of the SADC, and a regular mediator in regional conflicts.

Several local journalists have been forced to flee the country, and JamiiForums, a popular African social network, was temporarily shut down for “misleading and insulting” conduct. Freedom House recently demoted Tanzania from “partly free” to “not free.” The situation deteriorated further when, according to the main opposition party, about 700 people were killed during three days of election protests. Hassan’s reversal has so far disappointed many international and local observers who saw an opportunity for democratic opening in Tanzania under her leadership.

Washington continues to value Tanzania’s role as a stabilizing force in East Africa, a founding member of the EAC, a member of the SADC, and a regular mediator in regional conflicts. Bilateral military engagements focus on professionalizing the Tanzanian armed forces, maritime security, counternarcotics, and peacekeeping readiness through initiatives like the International Military Education and Training program and the African Maritime Security Initiative. Tanzania also possesses substantial resources in gold, natural gas, and agricultural products, and it is a promising emerging market. Though the United States has traditionally emphasized aid to Tanzania, Washington now aims to pivot toward a partnership driven more by trade and investment in areas including LNG, nickel processing, and agricultural processing.

Washington will face significant competition from Beijing in executing this strategy. Tanzania has enjoyed a long-term relationship with China, and the ruling party is a longtime partner of the Chinese Communist Party. Beijing elevated its relations with Tanzania to a “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership” in 2022, and the rate of China-Tanzania trade has grown by nearly 13 percent over the past five years. Also in 2022, China opened the Nyerere Leadership School in Kibaha, Tanzania, with a political training institution aimed at strengthening the incumbency of liberation parties in southern Africa.

A Way Ahead

Both Mozambique and Tanzania have experienced significant democratic backsliding over the past five years. And yet, there remains a strong demand for democracy and multiparty governance in both countries. In 2024, 79 percent of Tanzanians reported that they preferred democracy to any other kind of government, consistent with surveys from 2012. A 2022 poll in Mozambique showed that 67 percent of respondents believe multiparty competition is needed to provide citizens with real choices—a jump of 23 points compared with 2002. Apart from the mechanics of periodic elections, populations in each country have sought rule of law, decreased corruption, and the exercise of basic rights, like the freedoms of speech and assembly.

The United States can play a role in helping meet that demand while building stronger economic and military partnerships and countering the influence of its adversaries. The following actions offer a modest starting point toward those goals.

Reinvest in diplomacy. At a minimum, the United States should issue statements criticizing human rights violations, applauding and welcoming improvements, and observing the integrity of elections in Mozambique and Tanzania. The Trump administration has generally dissuaded U.S. embassies from commenting on foreign elections, but local experts still believe that the U.S. voice is influential and can discourage authoritarian behavior in both countries.

Washington should also fill vacant diplomatic posts in Africa. The ambassador positions in both Mozambique and Tanzania remain vacant as of October 2025, with no nominees in sight. Though both embassies boast very able acting officials, filling the vacancies should be a priority. The State Department also lacks an assistant secretary of state for African affairs, the USAID offices in each country have been gutted, and the department’s reorganization of foreign aid administration remains a work in progress. While offices may well benefit from reforms and streamlining their missions, they require confirmed, senior officials in place to execute policy. Much of U.S. engagement with countries like Tanzania and Mozambique happens on the ground or among midlevel Washington officials, and the administration should move quickly to fill the range of vacant jobs.

Diplomacy should extend beyond the executive branch as well. Members of Congress should travel to Mozambique and Tanzania; personal exchanges such as these are invaluable to building lasting, productive cooperation between the United States and foreign governments. State governors, especially those whose states would benefit from investment in Africa, might also make visits and build out cooperation at different levels of government.

Engage with youth populations. U.S. embassies in both countries should invest in programs to engage youth populations. Africa has the youngest population in the world, with a high percentage of new workforce entrants, half of whom will come from Sub-Saharan Africa by 2030. It will only become more important—and a greater opportunity—for the United States to engage this emerging demographic. Initiatives similar to the Young Lions Club program established during Ambassador Mark Green’s tenure in Dar es Salaam would be a good place to start. That effort aimed to engage rising leaders in politics and business, exposing them to American culture and ideas. By hosting rising stars at U.S. embassy events and connecting them with American officials, the United States can build stronger ties with the future leadership of both countries.

Prioritize anticorruption efforts. High rates of corruption in Mozambique and Tanzania are a significant barrier to creating a more just, democratic society. Mozambique recently landed on the Financial Action Task Force’s “grey list” under increased monitoring, and Tanzania was taken off the list only in June 2025. While there is no magic bullet for eliminating corruption and the U.S. ability to reduce it will always be limited, anticorruption efforts should represent a key element of Washington’s approach to both countries.

Efforts to reduce and mitigate corruption can begin with training local project supervisors to better monitor the use of funds and by increasing local capacity to track and identify corrupt practices. U.S. officials should also partner with local governments and work with political parties across the spectrum. The International Republican Institute, for instance, before its U.S. government funding was cut significantly this year, took a leading role in engaging political parties in both countries. Policymakers in Washington should restore such funding, in whole or in part, to continue these efforts.

The United States stands to gain from less corruption in both countries. U.S. companies with stakes in large energy and infrastructure projects, such as ExxonMobil’s role in the Rovuma Basin natural gas project in Mozambique, have suffered increased project costs, delayed timelines, and regulatory uncertainty. Reducing corruption would lead to more predictable environments for private U.S. companies looking to invest.

Both Mozambique and Tanzania have experienced significant democratic backsliding over the past five years. And yet, there remains a strong demand for democracy and multiparty governance in both countries.

Leverage economic engagement to promote good governance and U.S. interests. In a marked shift away from decades of U.S. policy, the Trump administration is prioritizing private sector trade and investment in Africa over traditional foreign aid programs. Though this leaves the U.S. government with fewer mechanisms to condition funding on good governance and respect for human rights, it retains capacity via the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). As the DFC is expanded, its investments should remain conditional on countries not having repeatedly supported international terrorism and not engaging in consistent patterns of human rights violations.

Along with expanding its financial portfolio, the DFC should be granted more operational flexibility and streamlined lending procedures. In addition to financial benefits for U.S. companies, creating a more agile, effective development finance institution would enable the United States to better compete with China, which financed, for example, nearly $57 billion in critical mineral extraction projects across 19 countries from 2000 to 2021. With updated policies and practices, the DFC can serve more effectively as a tool to encourage investment in sectors that matter to U.S. security interests, including in critical minerals.

The United States should also continue to pursue MCC compacts in the region. The five-year investment agreements not only provide a platform for investments by U.S. companies but can also be used to encourage more transparent and accountable practices in counterpart countries. Mozambique has an active compact that will facilitate U.S. investment. Tanzania, on the other hand, had its partnership suspended in 2016 after a pattern of actions inconsistent with MCC eligibility criteria, including failing to ensure fair elections and freedom of expression. Some observers note that previous MCC scorecards, which assess eligibility for the compacts, make choices among objectives; they argue that in Mozambique, for instance, the latest scorecard weighted the existence of laws more heavily than their actual implementation. Moving forward, the United States should ensure that MCC compacts are used to effectively encourage better governance.

Finally, Washington should employ the EXIM Bank to invest in key African countries while supporting U.S. jobs and competing with Russia and China for influence. EXIM recently lent $4.7 billion to TotalEnergies for Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado LNG project, awarding over 40 percent of contracts for the project to U.S. companies and contractors while mitigating adversarial financing of critical energy infrastructure in the region.

Invest in digital infrastructure and connectivity. The United States should pursue improved digital infrastructure and connectivity in Mozambique and Tanzania. American artificial intelligence companies might provide free or low-cost access in both markets, which could eventually be monetized through premium services. Investments in areas like telecom, broadband access, and data centers will likely require the U.S. government to partner with both the private sector and third countries. Yet such investments may serve the twin benefits of supporting economic development and countering Chinese technological dominance in the region.

Continue to invest in counterterrorism cooperation. Terrorism and the flows of illicit finance that support it remain pervasive risks in Mozambique and across Africa. The United States should continue to invest in existing counterterrorism efforts in both countries, including programs to monitor the flow of illicit funds.

The active insurgency in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado region has created a security challenge that puts U.S. interests at risk, including natural gas investments and critical mineral supply chains. In addition to supplying nonlethal military equipment to Mozambique to fight terrorism in the province, the U.S. military should consider joining the European Union in training Mozambique’s military in counterinsurgency strategy and tactics.

Support independent media and civil society. A robust civil society and independent media are essential components of any functioning democracy. Much U.S. work in this area has been halted over the past year, including through cuts to USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). One of USAID’s work pillars in both countries was to enhance media freedom and improve the capacity of local journalists. Today there is a sense on the ground, and naturally among former recipients of U.S. assistance, that the cuts have dealt a serious blow to media freedom. Washington should look to restore NED funding in a way that aligns with administration priorities, and it should use the opportunity created by the aid cutoffs to design new tools for supporting independent media and civil society.

Conclusion

The greatest U.S. foreign policy priorities—the Middle East, the war in Ukraine, China and the Indo-Pacific, and narcotrafficking in the Caribbean—tend to consume an enormous amount of bandwidth in Washington. Yet even as some of these priorities shift under a new U.S. administration, the United States retains key interests and long-standing relationships in many regions and among many countries. This short policy brief has examined how a globally active United States should engage with Mozambique and Tanzania, two important countries in East Africa. Its analysis and recommendations are plainly illustrative and not comprehensive.

The United States retains interests in both countries, including securing access to resources and critical minerals, encouraging stability rather than insurgency, effectively competing with China and Russia for influence, and striking commercial deals. The pursuit of these goals will be made easier if and as Mozambique and Tanzania improve their governance, rule of law, basic rights, anticorruption efforts, and level of democracy. Where there are willing partners, within or outside governments, Washington should be active in supporting their efforts. The recommendations contained in this policy brief can represent a step in that direction.

About the Authors

Richard Fontaine is the CEO of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). He served as president of CNAS from 2012 to 2019 and as senior fellow from 2009 to 2012. Before joining CNAS, he was foreign policy advisor to Senator John McCain and worked at the State Department, on the National Security Council (NSC), and on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Fontaine also spent a year teaching English in Japan. He currently serves as executive director of the Trilateral Commission and has been an adjunct professor in the security studies program at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

Gibbs McKinley is the research associate to the CEO at CNAS. Her work encompasses U.S. national security, the history of U.S. foreign policy, and global threats to democracy. McKinley previously worked on the Countering Foreign Authoritarian Influence program in the Center for Global Impact at the International Republican Institute. She also has prior experience working on transatlantic relations, for both CNAS’s Transatlantic Security Program and the Brookings Institution’s Center on the United States and Europe. McKinley interned with the U.S. Department of State at Embassy Valletta, Malta. She holds an MA from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, as well as a first-class honors degree in modern history from the University of St. Andrews, Scotland.

Acknowledgments

The authors are grateful to Ambassador Mark Green for his valuable input on earlier drafts of this policy brief. This brief would not have been possible without contributions from our colleagues at CNAS, including Emma Swislow, Caroline Steel, and Maura McCarthy. This policy brief was made possible with the generous support of Humanity United.

As a research and policy institution committed to the highest standards of organizational, intellectual, and personal integrity, CNAS maintains strict intellectual independence and sole editorial direction and control over its ideas, projects, publications, events, and other research activities. CNAS does not take institutional positions on policy issues, and the content of CNAS publications reflects the views of their authors alone. In keeping with its mission and values, CNAS does not engage in lobbying activity and complies fully with all applicable federal, state, and local laws. CNAS will not engage in any representational activities or advocacy on behalf of any entities or interests and, to the extent that the Center accepts funding from non-U.S. sources, its activities will be limited to bona fide scholastic, academic, and research-related activities, consistent with applicable federal law. The Center publicly acknowledges on its website annually all donors who contribute.

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  42. “ExxonMobil Delays Mozambique LNG Project FID to 2026,” Offshore Technology, November 7, 2024, https://www.offshore-technology.com/news/exxonmobil-delays-mozambique-lng-project/; Caitlin Maslen, “Corruption Risks in Mozambique’s Energy Sector,” Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, July 30, 2024, https://www.u4.no/publications/corruption-risks-in-mozambiques-energy-sector. ↩
  43. Ramsey Day, “How a U.S.-Africa Business Summit Could Launch a New Era of U.S.-Africa Relations,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 16, 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/06/united-states-africa-business-summit-trump?lang=en. ↩
  44. Shayerah I. Akhtar and Nick M. Brown, U.S. International Development Finance Corporation: Overview and Issues (Congressional Research Service, January 10, 2022), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47006. ↩
  45. Aubrey Hruby, “DFC 2.0: A Blueprint for a Bigger, Faster and More Strategic Agency,” Atlantic Council, September 11, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/dfc-2-0-a-blueprint-for-a-bigger-faster-and-more-strategic-agency/. ↩
  46. Hruby, “DFC 2.0.” ↩
  47. “Infrastructure and Critical Minerals,” U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, https://www.dfc.gov/our-work/infrastructure-and-critical-minerals. ↩
  48. “Compacts,” Millenium Challenge Corporation, https://www.mcc.gov/how-we-work/program/compact/. ↩
  49. U.S. Embassy in Mozambique, “The U.S. Government Confirms the Continuation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact in Mozambique,” press release, September 18, 2025, https://mz.usembassy.gov/the-u-s-government-confirms-the-continuation-of-the-millennium-challenge-corporation-compact-in-mozambique/; Millenium Challenge Corporation, “MCC Statement on Decision of Board of Directors to Suspend Partnership with Tanzania,” press release, March 28, 2016, https://www.mcc.gov/news-and-events/release/stmt-032816-tanzania-partnership-suspended/. ↩
  50. Interview with expert in Mozambique on September 11, 2025. ↩
  51. Loni Prinsloo, Francois de Beaupuy, and Paul Burkhardt, “US Exim Approves $4.7 Billion Loan for Total Mozambique LNG,” Bloomberg, March 14, 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-14/us-exim-approves-4-7-billion-loan-for-total-s-mozambique-lng; interview with expert in Tanzania, September 8, 2025. ↩
  52. Interview with expert in Tanzania, September 8, 2025. ↩
  53. “Country Reports on Terrorism 2022: Tanzania,” U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2022/tanzania; interview, September 9, 2025, Tanzania. ↩
  54. “Mozambique: US Agrees to Supply Non-Lethal Military Equipment to Cabo Delgado,” Club of Mozambique, August 17, 2023, https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-us-agrees-to-supply-non-lethal-military-equipment-to-cabo-delgado-243437/; interview with expert in Mozambique on September 12, 2025. ↩
  55. Interview with expert in Tanzania on September 9, 2025. ↩

Authors

  • Richard Fontaine

    Chief Executive Officer

    Richard Fontaine is the chief executive officer of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). He served as president of CNAS from 2012–19 and as senior fellow from 2009–12...

  • Gibbs McKinley

    Research Associate to the CEO

    Gibbs McKinley is the research associate to the CEO. Her work encompasses U.S. national security, the history of U.S. foreign policy, and global threats to democracy. McKinley...