The Axis of Upheaval

Likewise, their cooperation will not end with Russia’s war against Ukraine. Russia’s aims go beyond Ukraine, and Moscow will continue to view cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea as essential to accomplishing these aims. Even if U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration seeks to normalize relations with Moscow, the Kremlin will not fully shed its view of the United States as a threat and impediment to its objectives. Moreover, Russia may not be the only driver of cooperation. As U.S. competition with China intensifies, Beijing is likely to become ever more invested in cooperation with members of the axis as Beijing seeks closer partnerships to bolster its efforts to counter Washington.

Looking forward, the military challenges that the axis of upheaval poses are likely to grow. Military cooperation within the axis is likely to shorten the time it will take Russia to reconstitute its conventional forces, increasing the pressure on Europe to more rapidly ramp up its own capabilities. Axis cooperation will also complicate the picture for U.S and allied defense planners who can no longer assume that any one of these countries would fight alone, either because one or more of these countries provides military aid and weapons or, less likely, fighters. There is also a rising risk of simultaneity, or the prospect that these countries could initiate more than one crisis at the same time, in an explicitly coordinated or opportunistic manner.

Growing axis cooperation—their joint use of bases, for example—is also likely to increase Russia’s and China’s abilities to project power into regions where they would not otherwise have a presence, allowing axis countries to carry out new types of operations, raising questions about the survivability of U.S. forces, and creating new contingencies for the United States.

Through their cooperation, these countries are also gaining valuable information and learning lessons that may strengthen each country’s military, and their collaboration will likely increase the resilience of their regimes. Finally, cooperation among the axis countries may undercut the global nuclear and missile nonproliferation regime—thereby weakening strategic stability. Policymakers can no longer afford to view these countries as discrete threats but instead must understand—and disrupt—the growing connections among them.

Introduction

Russia’s war against Ukraine has been devastating for Ukraine and its people. The effects of the war have also reverberated far beyond Ukraine, creating new geopolitical dynamics. Among the most transformative of these effects has been the way Russia’s war has spurred greater cooperation between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea—or what the authors call the “axis of upheaval,” a term intended to convey these countries’ shared commitment to overturning the rules and norms that govern today’s global system.¹

Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014 accelerated the ties between Moscow and Beijing that had taken root in the waning days of the Cold War. Sensing it had little future with the West because of the sanctions imposed on Russia following its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2015, the Kremlin committed then to growing its partnership with Beijing. Tehran, too, had already set in motion its own pivot to the east prior to February 2022.² But although these relationships were developing, Russia’s full-scale invasion was a critical catalyst, taking their previous levels of cooperation to new heights. North Korea, for its part, capitalized on the opportunity the conflict presented to make itself newly important to the Kremlin. Its deployment of troops into Russia in late 2024 underscores just how quickly cooperation can evolve among countries where power is so highly concentrated in the hands of an individual leader or a small ruling clique.³

Cooperation among the axis members spans the full spectrum of their relations, including the military, economic, political, and informational domains of their partnerships. Their cooperation enables them to present an alternative to the U.S.-led international system, including through their efforts to dilute the efficacy of Western sanctions, reduce the centrality of the U.S. dollar, align their messaging to increase the legitimacy to their narratives, and to provide political cover in international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) to shield them from international pressure.⁴ These effects make it harder for the United States and its allies to address their destabilizing actions.

But perhaps the most consequential effects of the axis of upheaval stem from their growing defense cooperation. Already, defense ties between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea have enabled Russia to sustain its aggression against Ukraine, increased the military capabilities of each country, supported their more brazen and destabilizing actions, and magnified gray zone actions against the United States and its allies. Although much of this cooperation occurs bilaterally among specific dyads of the axis, that cooperation is increasingly beneficial to the overall group. Russian advancements on the battlefield in Ukraine, for example, are diffusing to each of the members of the axis. Iranian drone technology now flows through Russia to North Korea and China, and Russian defense officials frequently travel from one axis capital to the next, creating connectivity among multiple members of the axis that would not otherwise exist.⁵ In short, while much of the defense cooperation is conducted bilaterally, there are greater instances of trilateral cooperation, and increasingly synergies that amplify the military threat the axis of upheaval poses to the United States and its allies. Even as Russia and China provided immediate support to Iran in the face of Israeli and U.S. strikes, questions remain about the extent to which the axis will help Iran reconstitute its capacity to antagonize the United States, including its possible efforts to obtain a nuclear weapon. Policymakers can no longer afford to view these countries as discrete threats but instead must understand—and disrupt—the growing connections among them.

The cooperation among the axis of upheaval will persist, despite some claims that Russia’s and China’s limited support for Iran amid Israeli and U.S. strikes or the eventual conclusion of the Ukraine war will spell the end of their ties. China, Iran, and North Korea deliberated for months on the sidelines of Russia’s war before moving to more fully support Moscow after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. China gave little more than its diplomatic support to the Kremlin in the first months after Russia’s invasion, and it was nearly six months until public reports documented the arrival of Iran’s drones in Russia. While these countries are reticent to incur unnecessary costs on behalf of their partners, they will seek out opportunities to support one another, especially in ways that help them withstand Western pressure. The incentives fueling their cooperation have not changed since Israel’s actions against Iran, and, if anything, Russia, China, and North Korea are likely to see value in helping Tehran reconstitute its capacity to antagonize the United States and create policy dilemmas for Washington.

Likewise, the cooperation among the axis of upheaval will endure beyond Russia’s war against Ukraine. Russia may have turned to China, Iran, and North Korea to help sustain its aggression against Kyiv, but Moscow’s objectives extend beyond Ukraine. Russia not only seeks to control Kyiv and its choices, but also to push the United States out of Europe and revise the European security order. Even if U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration seeks to normalize relations with Moscow, the Kremlin will not abandon those objectives.⁶ Nor will Moscow fully shed its view of the United States as a threat and key impediment to those objectives. The Kremlin perceives that many—even a majority—within the U.S. government and public maintain hostile views of Russia and could thwart or reverse Trump’s actions.⁷ Likewise, the Kremlin cannot be sure that the next U.S. leader will not be more focused on strengthening transatlantic relations and/or democracy and human rights. Russian President Vladimir Putin is likely to judge that Russia will once again find itself in confrontation with the United States and therefore will not turn on his partners in China, Iran, and North Korea. Instead, Putin is likely to seek to get as much as he can for Russia while Trump is in office, including by trying to lock in gains for Russia that would be difficult for future U.S. and European leaders to reverse, such as subjugating Ukraine or undermining the credibility of NATO’s commitment to collective defense. Russia will continue to see cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea as important in that endeavor, creating a basis for sustained cooperation.

Moreover, Europe is on course to rapidly ramp up its military capabilities and will remain a key barrier to any Russian efforts to expand its influence and aggression, keeping it in Moscow’s crosshairs.⁸ Already, the Kremlin is adapting its narratives to portray Europe as its primary adversary—or a “war party,” as Russian public statements have suggested.⁹ At a minimum, the Kremlin will sustain its efforts to intimidate countries in Europe to force them to pursue policies that are less antagonistic toward Russia. To that end, the Kremlin will continue to view cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea as strengthening its efforts to undermine not just NATO, but also other U.S. alliances and partnerships, including the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliances and U.S. partnerships in the Middle East.

In these ways, Russia is likely to sustain its role as a key driver of and conduit for the axis of upheaval. Yet, Russia may not be the only driver going forward. As U.S. competition with China intensifies, Beijing is likely to become ever more invested in cooperation with members of the axis as it seeks closer partnerships to bolster its efforts to counter Washington. If China becomes more intent on increasing its influence over Taiwan, Beijing will likely increase its outreach to and support for members of the axis to strengthen its own position, serving as a critical secondary driver of this axis.

Going forward, the axis of upheaval will continue to matter as military ties between the members evolve, including in ways that amplify the challenge each individual country poses to the United States and its allies. Together, they will create new challenges that Washington and its partners must confront. Sustained Russian military cooperation with the axis countries is likely to shorten the time it will take Russia to reconstitute its conventional forces. That cooperation will also complicate military assessments for U.S and allied defense planners who can no longer assume that any one of these countries would fight alone—either because one or more of the axis countries provides military aid and weapons or, less likely, fighters. Finally, their cooperation is likely to increase Russia’s and China’s abilities to project power, facilitate learning and the sharing of best practices, support the stability of those authoritarian governments, and further undermine the nonproliferation regime and global strategic stability.

This report assesses these military implications of the axis of upheaval. Rather than providing an inventory of the implications of each bilateral partnership, this report seeks to assess the overarching impact of the axis as a whole. The impact of their growing coordination is likely to be greater than the sum of their bilateral relationships, making it critical to think broadly about the challenge. To this end, the first section of this report identifies the military impact of the axis of upheaval so far. It then assesses the key drivers and constraints of their defense cooperation going forward, underscoring why their cooperation is likely to persist even after the war in Ukraine ends and despite changing dynamics in U.S.-Russia relations. Finally, this report projects the potential future implications of their military ties, should their cooperation continue and evolve. The coordination among members of the axis of upheaval has developed more quickly and deeply than observers expected just a few years ago, and greater multilateral coordination has the potential to expand. Policymakers should therefore plan and prepare for what the next three to five years might have in store.