Manufacturing a New National Security

Introduction

The United States sits atop the world’s pedestal of military superpowers—particularly when it comes to developing and employing the most sophisticated technology—and no foreign government would seriously question that assertion. But the fight the Joint Force is preparing for will be waged inside contested environments, from tighter operating spaces, and with high rates of munitions expenditure that recent conflicts have already demonstrated. The constraint is no longer whether America can invent superior weapons; it is whether the defense industrial base (DIB) can build them fast enough, and whether the government can buy them in quantity before a crisis rather than during one. It’s reported that peer adversaries may be able to outpace the United States in both development speed and production scale, revealing a serious problem in how American military hardware is made. Acquisition reform matters, but reform alone does not build anything. The DIB needs a fundamentally different approach to manufacturing rapidly evolving capability at scale.

Key Takeaways

• The Joint Force will fight in contested environments where basing is constrained and inventories are depleted quickly. Growing munitions stockpiles ahead of a conflict through real purchases is a precondition for credible deterrence.
• Modular, adaptable manufacturing changes the economics of building munitions: multiple products on a single production line, configuration changes without retooling, and qualification of processes rather than individual parts. Concept-to-production timelines get measured in months, not years.
• Nimble, diversified companies that disrupt the traditional supply chain and provide nontraditional entry to the DIB are essential to America’s future national security.
• Capability is not capacity. Converting one into the other requires clear demand signals from the government, in the form of signed contracts, multiyear funding, and purchase orders with real lead time.

The Fight the Joint Force Is Building For

For two decades, the United States prepared its military for uncontested skies, secure logistics, and standoff ranges that no adversary could threaten. That environment is gone. A peer fight means constrained basing, crowded launch platforms, compressed engagement windows, and resupply that cannot be assumed. Not every target sits at the far end of a comfortable standoff; the Joint Force needs weapons it can push forward, launch from confined operating areas, and adapt between sorties.

It also needs far more of them. Recent operations have shown how fast modern conflict consumes high-end inventory—hundreds of interceptors are expended in days while replenishment timelines are measured in years. That arithmetic only works if the United States buys munitions now, in quantities sized for the conflicts it may have to fight, and grows those stockpiles before a crisis begins.

Modular Manufacturing Is the Unlock

Legacy defense manufacturing is organized around dedicated lines built for a single product. That model fit an era when threats evolved across decades. It fails when requirements change between fiscal years, because every new variant demands new tooling, a fresh qualification campaign, and lead times that outlast the threat that prompted them.

Modular, adaptable manufacturing inverts that logic by creating product-agnostic tooling and common architectures enabling changeovers to be conducted by software rather than a capital project.

Four pillars are necessary to enable adaptability: additive manufacturing; vertical integration of complex machining; design, build and test colocation; and multiproduct line design. Each pillar works in tandem with the others, creating a streamlined, in-house production process that cuts lead times by anywhere from 12–18 weeks. Ursa Major, where both authors currently hold leadership roles, is one proof point. Our adaptable manufacturing practice allows us to print four different diameter solid rocket motors (SRMs) at the same time and on the same line. That production efficiency lets the company scale production and development catered exactly to the warfighters’ demands.

The result is a flexible munitions line that pivots to address new threats rather than requiring the creation of a completely new production cell. Scaling that production can then run parallel with product development instead of racing to catch up.

What It Buys the Warfighter

When put into practice, the four manufacturing pillars fundamentally change what the Joint Force can field and afford. L3Harris has seen recent success in hypersonic propulsions through additive manufacturing, reporting their production times have increased tenfold and at a lower cost. Evolving our defense industrial base’s manufacturing method not only improves speed but also unlocks product innovation. Beehive Industries recently announced it is full-rate production ready to produce 3-D printed Frenzy 8 jet engines to power the next generation of drones, expendable aircraft, and other uncrewed systems critical to our nation’s defense. And we see it within our own walls. Our hypersonic Draper liquid rocket engine is 60 percent additively manufactured and storable, creating a longer shelf life and always ready to deploy. The operator can maneuver the engine in flight, giving direct control over speed and trajectory to create unpredictable profiles.

Time and money are where innovation becomes a stockpile conversation. Building this way took a hypersonic missile from contract to flight in just seven months. Today, the Ursa Major HAVOC Missile System, powered by the Draper engine and boosted by in-house SRMs, costs less than $3 million per round against comparable systems that run $15 million–plus. Those figures decide whether the United States buys tens of rounds or thousands, directly informing our warfighters’ readiness to engage.

Recommendations

• Congress should fund munitions procurement at peer-conflict quantities and commit across multiple years. Single-year buys do not send signals a manufacturer can responsibly invest against.
• The military services should convert validated capability into signed contracts and purchase orders with real lead time. Stated intent does not underwrite machines, technicians, or qualified processes; orders do.
• The government should enable private capital to accelerate production. Private capital funds a company to build a capability. A government contract validates it. That contract becomes the demand signal unlocking larger investment aimed at capacity rather than survival. This leads to faster manufacturing and a base that is ready before the requirement turns urgent.
• The Pentagon should place real orders with proven new entrants, not incumbents alone. A diversified supplier base is what makes surge capacity real.

Conclusion

The next war will not be won by the country with the most advanced blueprint, but by the one that can turn that blueprint into hardware the fastest and in the greatest numbers. Companies across the DIB have not waited for permission; they have built the factories, proven the technology, and shown that modular manufacturing works at the pace deterrence demands. The question is whether the policymakers who fund the base will move with the same urgency. America does not have a technology problem. It has a production problem, and the fix is in hand.

About the Authors

James Swartout is the vice president for defense and head of Washington operations at Ursa Major. He previously served in senior advisory roles across the Pentagon and Department of the Air Force.

Nick Doucette is vice president of strategic operations and cofounder at Ursa Major. He previously led multiple manufacturing teams at SpaceX.

About the New American Industrial Base Series

This essay series, The New American Defense Industrial Base, features expert practitioners with experience in government, industry, and finance writing on the most pressing challenges in defense acquisition today. For more in this series, click here. The defense industrial base series is made possible by general support to the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) Defense Program and corporate support for the series.

About the Center for a New American Security

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