Forecasting the Future of the Axis of Upheaval

Russia would probably do more to support China and North Korea in a crisis than it did for Iran. The scope of that support will depend on several factors, but above all, the trajectory and outcome of the war in Ukraine. As long as Moscow believes it must preserve resources for the possibility of renewed conflict with Ukraine—or for potential opportunistic military action against Europe—it will remain more cautious about committing significant capabilities elsewhere. Russia’s willingness to provide broader support will also depend on the pace of its military reconstitution, including the degree to which sanctions and export controls constrain its defense industrial base, and partner requests—especially from China, which would likely seek to tightly manage escalation and outside involvement in a Taiwan contingency. In these cases, Russia is unlikely to remain on the sidelines, instead seeking opportunities to impose costs on the United States and reinforce alignment where it can do so at manageable risk.

Russia’s incentives to invest in its strategic partnerships will persist beyond the war in Ukraine. Moscow will continue to rely on these relationships to rebuild its military, mitigate sanctions, and strengthen its position in what its sees as a long-term competition with the United States. For U.S. and allied policymakers, the challenge is not a formal alliance but an adaptive network that increases uncertainty, prolongs conflicts through external support, and may embolden adversaries.

Introduction

During Operation Epic Fury, Russia moved beyond rhetorical backing to provide Iran with tangible, battlefield-relevant support. Moscow signaled political support for Iran’s new supreme leader, reportedly shared intelligence and drone tactics drawn from its war in Ukraine, and supplied upgraded drone systems—including variants derived from the technology Tehran once provided to Russia—that enabled Iranian strikes against U.S. targets.¹ Yet these steps remained carefully calibrated. Even as Russia materially enhanced Iran’s ability to fight, it avoided direct participation in the conflict, stopping short of actions that would risk a direct confrontation with the United States. Compared to the June 2025 conflict—when Russia and China largely remained on the sidelines—this marked a step-change in the depth of support, even as clear limits persist.

Russia’s behavior reveals a defining feature of the “axis of upheaval,” or the tightening set of relationships between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea: cooperation that is real and increasingly consequential, but ultimately bounded by each member’s own priorities, risk tolerance, and desire to avoid direct conflict with the United States.² This mix of expanding support and clear restraint raises fundamental questions about the nature of that alignment and the role of self-interest in shaping it. What challenges does the alignment of these powers pose to policymakers and U.S. warfighters when their mutual support consists primarily of enabling capabilities but not “boots on the ground” (although North Korea took that step for Russia amid the war in Ukraine)? How far might these countries be willing to go to support one another, especially in moments of acute crisis and conflict? To what extent is this constellation of countries strategically significant and worthy of policymaker attention?

This report addresses these questions by looking at the axis of upheaval from Russia’s point of view. The Kremlin has been the critical catalyst of the deepening cooperation with China, North Korea, and Iran, so understanding its aims and motivations provides critical insight into the likely trajectory of this axis and the challenges that it poses to the United States and its allies.

The report argues that, from Moscow’s perspective, its partnerships with China, North Korea, and Iran will remain significant and valuable. Russia’s support to Iran illustrates the flexibility of its ties with its strategic partners. Even amid the demands of the war in Ukraine, Moscow selectively expanded its support to Tehran as opportunities arose, calibrating its actions to advance its interests while managing risk. The Ukraine war has strained Russian military and economic resources and, just as importantly, consumed the Kremlin’s tolerance for additional risk. Russian President Vladimir Putin is reluctant to take actions in support of partners that could jeopardize Russia’s primary war effort in Ukraine. Yet rather than backing away entirely, Moscow pursues an opportunistic approach—one that allows Moscow to impose costs on the United States, reinforce alignment with partners, and preserve room for maneuver in its broader confrontation with Washington, including over Ukraine.

Looking forward, Russia’s partnerships with China, North Korea, and Iran will remain central to the Kremlin’s broader strategic outlook. If anything, the recent U.S. actions targeting Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and the killing of Iran’s supreme leader reinforce Putin’s long-standing view that Washington acts unilaterally and topples leaders it views as hostile. In Moscow’s view, these events confirm that the international system is increasingly governed not by rules but by power—where strength determines outcomes and weaker states are vulnerable to coercion or regime change. For Moscow, its relationships with China, Iran, and North Korea, therefore, are not peripheral—they are central to ensuring that Russia remains influential on the global stage. By deepening military, economic, and technological cooperation with these partners, Moscow seeks to build resilience and strengthen Russia’s position in a world that the Kremlin increasingly believes will reward the strong and punish the weak.

While the war in Ukraine continues, Moscow will likely look for opportunities to sustain and leverage these relationships wherever possible. The conflict with Iran provides Moscow with another opportunity to raise costs for the United States, and the longer tensions in the Middle East persist, the more willing Russia may become to provide support that helps Tehran prolong the instability and/or tie down U.S. resources in the region. The eventual end of the war in Ukraine is also unlikely to diminish Russia’s motivation for cooperation. The Kremlin believes it is less vulnerable to U.S. pressure when it operates alongside capable partners and will ensure it has resources to support its partners in future contests with the United States—particularly in scenarios involving China.

The first section of the report articulates Russia’s foreign policy objectives and the role that its strategic partnerships play in advancing those aims. The second and third sections identify the key drivers and limits of Russian support for its partners. The fourth section seeks to forecast how far Russia would be willing to go to support Iran in the current conflict, and how much Russia would do for China and North Korea in a crisis once the war in Ukraine is over.