March 02, 2026

Trump’s Way of War

By: Richard Fontaine

This article was originally published in Foreign Affairs.

When bombs began falling on Iran this weekend, most Americans were as surprised as the rest of the world. The U.S. force posture in the Middle East had been building in the preceding weeks, but negotiations between Washington and Tehran were still underway. Even as the U.S. military readied for an attack, the Trump administration obscured the exact objective. There was remarkably little national debate, scant discussion with U.S. allies, and no vote in Congress about the desirability of conflict. Two days into the war, administration officials have yet to articulate a specific vision for how it will end. Instead of employing decisive force, U.S. President Donald Trump is prioritizing flexibility. This stance reflects a new way of war—visible across multiple Trump interventions, from the Red Sea to Venezuela—that inverts traditional thinking on the use of force.

Whether the interventions’ problems came from a misapplication of the Powell Doctrine or from the misconception of the approach itself, the dark shadows of Afghanistan and Iraq have colored every U.S. military intervention of the past two decades, including the war now underway in Iran.

Indeed, in many ways, Trump’s use of force is the anti–Powell Doctrine. Developed during the Gulf War (1990–91) by General Colin Powell, who later served as secretary of state, the Powell Doctrine held that force should be employed only as a last resort, after all nonviolent means have been exhausted. If war is necessary, however, it should proceed in pursuit of a clear objective, with a clear exit strategy, and with public support. It should employ overwhelming, decisive force to defeat the enemy, using every resource—military, economic, political, social—available. Derived from the lessons of Vietnam, the approach was designed to avoid protracted conflicts, high death tolls, financial losses, and domestic divisions. As Powell later wrote, military leaders could not “quietly acquiesce in halfhearted warfare for half-baked reasons that the American people could not understand or support.”

Read the full article in Foreign Affairs.

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