Superpowers and AGI

This report offers a novel framework to explain the ways Washington or Beijing might gain or lose geopolitical power as AGI develops. It proposes five potential mechanisms through which AGI could affect U.S.-China strategic competition and the global balance of power: (1) boosted economic growth and productive capacity, (2) consolidated influence over the global information environment, (3) new military capabilities, (4) large-scale misalignment or loss of control, and (5) downstream political effects. The explanation of these mechanisms shows they could all function in complicated ways. Discussions of each consider how they might play out while also theorizing limits so as to inject some realism into a debate that often veers into the fantastical.

Assuming technological progress continues at its current pace or accelerates, the push toward AGI will shape U.S.-China geopolitical competition over the coming years and decades. The specific choices and risks that Washington and Beijing must contend with will vary as each country gets closer to AGI. This section examines those choices across four phases: both states are pursuing AGI, one state is on the cusp of AGI, one state possesses AGI while the other does not, and both states have AGI. Those phases might blur together, though, if AGI’s emergence ends up being neither discrete nor observable, which would affect policymakers’ calculus.

The race toward AGI and the technology’s potential emergence could have major implications for U.S.-China competition and increase the risk of military conflict or disaster in multiple ways. Strategic rivalry and the need for some level of U.S.-China coordination will exist in a state of constant tension. But policymakers will have to manage that tension instead of trying to resolve it by picking either unmanaged competition or unrealistic cooperation. To that end, policymakers in the United States should:

• Balance near- and long-term AI bets.
• Ensure U.S. resources and technology do not aid China’s AI development.
• Create diplomatic channels with allies and China focused on AI and ensure AGI’s potential emergence is on the agenda.
• Develop a technically sophisticated way to track inputs to AGI as well as key performance thresholds for frontier AI systems.
• Conduct a scenario exercise to test when and how the United States might intervene to stop China from developing AGI.
• Prepare to reverse engineer or steal AGI technology if China gets it first.
• Limit and counter the reach of authoritarian digital infrastructure.
• Provide AGI alternatives that are compatible with democracy and avoid unnecessary constraints on other countries’ sovereign choices.
• Build programs to cushion AGI’s effects on society to prevent the deterioration of societal cohesion at home and abroad.

Introduction

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems continue to progress at a steady pace.¹ That trend has fed forecasts that artificial general intelligence (AGI) could emerge in the near to medium term. Amid much discussion and debate regarding the technology’s development trajectory and potential implications, how AGI would affect geopolitical competition between the United States and China has received comparatively less rigorous attention.

This report aims to fill that gap. Instead of making a technological judgment about whether AGI will emerge, the paper stipulates a world where AGI is imminent or exists. Then, in that context, the paper employs informed speculation rooted in the current contexts and histories of U.S.-China strategic competition, international relations, and global security. The analysis is intended to help policymakers forecast and “see around corners” into the future, and to begin to understand how AGI might affect geopolitics between Washington and Beijing—including both the risks and the opportunities.

The report starts by defining AGI and assessing the ways it could emerge while adopting appropriate skepticism about the claims from AGI’s most ardent boosters. Next, the paper explains China’s vision for AI generally and situates Beijing’s approach to AGI in that broader context. The paper then considers whether and to what degree China is pursuing AGI, as opposed to promoting development and adoption of useful but less capable AI systems.

From there, the report offers a novel framework to explain the mechanisms by which Washington or Beijing might gain or lose geopolitical power and influence as AGI develops. Then, the paper examines the choices policymakers would face across different phases of AGI’s emergence, from neither state possessing AGI to both states having it. The report concludes with recommendations for U.S. and allied policymakers on how to prepare to compete and, where possible, cooperate with China in a world that is moving toward AGI and might eventually have it. The topic is timely, as prospects for U.S.-China AI diplomacy have improved since the countries’ leaders discussed AI in their May 2026 meeting in Beijing and instructed their representatives to set up a channel for further talks.²