April 30, 2026

Masked and Anonymous

Agency and Officer Identification as a Means to Promote Safety, Professionalism, and Accountability

Several years ago, when I was still a prosecutor, I was meeting with federal law enforcement officers (LEOs) setting up to execute a search warrant at a subject’s residence in the northern United States. The subject owned weapons, so the officers decided to have a tactical team ready. The team’s professionalism, focus, and methodical approach were impressive as they prepared. But one detail jumped out at me. One officer, who was wearing tactical-style clothing but not a uniform, had a patch on the front of his vest. It was not an agency or “Police” patch. Instead, it was the flag of a southern state. Given the threat and the mission, I was not about to tell the officer how to dress. But I remember thinking that if a paranoid armed subject saw this officer coming toward him with a weapon, would the subject distinguish the LEO from, say, a “lone wolf” wearing tactical-style gear or a militia member?

More recently, and on a much larger scale involving more direct contact, immigration and border officers frequently operate in nonuniform tactical-style clothing. They travel in unmarked vehicles. Their clothing often does not indicate their agency or identify them personally. Sometimes they wear logos or insignia that are not associated with their agency.

This is significant. Displaying an officer’s agency conveys that agent’s authority. It also communicates that the officer is operating under their agency’s professional standards. Displaying a unique identifier provides after-the-fact accountability. It also communicates to civilians that the officer is subject to that accountability. In contrast, officers wearing irregular, military- or tactical-style clothing, concealing their identities, and displaying unofficial insignia naturally create the fear that they are less disciplined, less organized, less professional, and less accountable. Those practices interfere with accountability in practice as well.

Displaying an officer’s agency conveys that agent’s authority. It also communicates that the officer is operating under their agency’s professional standards.

Officer safety is a critical consideration. Most LEOs do their dangerous jobs in uniform, unmasked, and wearing a name plate. If officers or agencies can demonstrate a risk of doxing or retaliation, officers should be able to protect themselves. And if officers serve in undercover capacities or are in a training pipeline to take undercover assignments, there must be some provision made for their future viability. A broad brush is not appropriate on either side. Rather, as proposed in this essay, a nuanced approach that establishes accountability and oversight is warranted.

There are several current legislative proposals to curb measures such as masking and concealing officers’ identities and affiliations. Combining and refining elements of each could yield a flexible approach that imposes agency and officer accountability, preserves public confidence, promotes democratic governance, and protects law enforcement safety and operations.

Officer Identification and Agency Affiliation

Many proposals require officers to wear something that clearly identifies them individually. Several provide the option for officers to display a unique identifier, such as a badge number, instead of their names. That makes sense. It provides accountability without facilitating doxing or other harassment. There is no inherent public interest in knowing an officer’s name as long as officers cannot change identifiers frequently and agency records can identify the officer if legal or disciplinary action is warranted—and as long as the agency is willing to, or can be compelled to, identify and discipline officers as appropriate.

Several bills also require officers to wear something that prominently identifies their agency. Most federal LEOs, like police detectives, routinely work in suits or street clothing, so a blanket requirement to wear clothing that identifies them and their agency while working would be infeasible. The proposals accordingly limit their application to certain activities. The VISIBLE Act includes the most comprehensive list of standard law enforcement duties, and the Preventing Authoritarian Policing Tactics on America’s Streets Act covers nonstandard activities such as large-scale deployments in the context of protests. Some proposed requirements go beyond many law enforcement agencies’ practices of plainclothes officers displaying their credentials and introducing themselves.

Particularly because of immigration officers’ irregular, nonuniform mode of dress and the aggressive street tactics they have recently employed, clearly identifying them as federal officers would likely enhance the safety of officers and those they encounter. It would also establish accountability for agency directors and local field office heads. If the news media, members of the public, internal watchdogs, and congressional committees can readily determine the agency involved in an action, they can more easily determine which leader is responsible at a policy and strategic level for that activity.

The specific circumstances under which agency-identifying clothing is required may need to be revised for practical purposes. But requiring clear and prominent identification of an officer’s agency affiliation would enhance accountability and professionalism by officers and clearly communicate those officers’ authority to civilians.

Face Coverings

Face coverings are, not surprisingly, a focus of current legislative proposals. Not so long ago, routine masking of enforcement officers was a completely alien concept in the United States. Recently, masked ICE officers have become the “face” of a perceived “secret police” to critics ranging from the Cato Institute to Democratic lawmakers.

According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), ICE officers wear masks “to prevent doxing.” Some commentators question how extensive this threat is, but there are no doubt some instances where doxing or another threat is a concern for officers based on their assigned duties. And tension in early 2025 between the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the then-acting FBI director over the potential public release of names of FBI agents who worked on investigations related to January 6, 2021, highlighted significant safety concerns associated with identifying agents involved in sensitive cases. Threats to officers and their families are serious and should be a nonpartisan issue. Routine masking, however, sends a message both to officers and the public that officers are more akin to an invading force than protectors of the community. Masks suggest to both sides that officers are not accountable and interfere with normal human face-to-face interactions that can de-escalate encounters. Indeed, one ICE agent involved in February 2026 removal operations was recently quoted as saying, “It was harder to calm the person down if I had somebody with me that’s in a mask. I like not being a hypocrite, and I would be nervous to open my door to a dude in a mask.”

Requiring clear and prominent identification of an officer’s agency affiliation would enhance accountability and professionalism by officers and clearly communicate those officers’ authority to civilians.

Neither DHS policy nor current legislative proposals adequately address whether and when officers should be permitted to conceal their faces during operations. Authorizing agents to conceal their identities to protect an “ongoing” undercover operation is a good start—an officer posing as a criminal conspirator on Thursday should not be seen on television engaging in law enforcement operations on Tuesday. But in addition to officers involved in ongoing undercover operations, many officers who work undercover or are in training to do so may not be involved in an “ongoing” operation at any given moment. They must also be able to preserve their safety and viability as undercover operatives.

There are existing models for assessing whether safety or operational concerns justify concealing an officer’s identity. For example, undercover officers who testify in court may identify themselves by badge number instead of name and testify in courtrooms closed to the public, but only if the government can establish a sufficient threat to safety or operations. Regulation of facial coverings could impose a similar standard to be applied administratively. If an officer can sufficiently articulate an operational concern or fear for their or their family’s safety based on established criteria, subject to criminal penalties for making a false statement, a supervisor could be authorized to permit that officer to wear a mask for a set period of time during public-facing operations. Supervisors’ approvals could be subject to audits by the inspector general and reported to Congress periodically. To give the statute more teeth, it could revert to a prohibition against masking unless Congress reauthorized the exemption process.

Agency- and Activity-Based Limitations

Current proposals generally either apply to ICE or DHS officers involved in immigration or border enforcement or to all federal LEOs when involved in crowd control or related activities.

The proposals appear intended to address two problems: first, activities by small teams to apprehend individuals and provide security for apprehending officers; and second, larger-scale responses to demonstrations, protests, and civil unrest. The reason to single out ICE, DHS generally, or immigration and border enforcement in the first context may be a reaction to specific activities, or it could be related to the fact that some officers involved in immigration enforcement may be civil enforcement officers and not trained as criminal investigators. In either case, as the sponsors of the VISIBLE Act have argued, harmonizing immigration enforcement practices with law enforcement practices is reasonable as immigration enforcement officers increasingly undertake operations that appear analogous to criminal law enforcement.

Relatedly, if federal officers are going to perform crowd control and similar operations that are more traditionally handled by state and local law enforcement, it is hard to see any basis to oppose requiring them to perform those functions in a manner similar to the local police. All officers, whether local, state, or federal, should be subject to consistent requirements that promote accountability and clearly communicate officers’ authority.

Unmarked Vehicles

The CLEAR ID Act would prohibit the use of unmarked vehicles by DHS officers engaged in civil immigration enforcement. This is partially based on proposed findings that criminal impersonations of immigration officers have increased. The thought of unmarked vehicles pulling up to a subject, the subject being placed in one of the vehicles, and the vehicles speeding away is alarming to many.

But such tactics are sometimes necessary to protect officer safety or to avoid alerting the subject, who could flee or present a danger to the public. The fact that a tactic causes alarm is not in and of itself a reason to prohibit it. Particularly if officers are required to prominently identify their agency and display a unique identifier, the added benefit of requiring marked vehicles may in many cases not be worth the costs in safety and effectiveness. The best answer here may be to impose more robust oversight over the use of specific tactics in immigration enforcement and assess whether a combination of tighter administrative guidelines, closer oversight, and adopting an officer-identification proposal sufficiently reduces overuse of aggressive tactics, including unnecessary use of unmarked vehicles or undue displays of force, while providing operational flexibility.

Other Possibilities

Many of the tactics that current proposals (see below) target have traditionally been used to some extent by LEOs. For example, FBI agents do not have to put on their windbreakers and name tags before interviewing a subject. Proposed requirements to curtail such tactics are at least in part a reaction to more routine, aggressive, widespread, and indiscriminate use of such measures in support of immigration enforcement and demonstration management by federal authorities. Some bright-line rules are important, but in enforcement operations there will always be a need for in-the-moment flexibility balanced by guidance and oversight.

In that regard, none of the proposals go so far as to move responsibility for law enforcement and immigration enforcement agencies or operations under the control of DOJ. None of the proposals would require DHS enforcement agencies to operate under guidelines issued by the U.S. attorney general, as the FBI and many other agencies do (including even the Central Intelligence Agency). Subjecting DHS agencies to guidelines established—and overseen—by DOJ could help harmonize federal enforcement standards.

DHS is a relatively young agency, has a sprawling set of missions, and commands a large and growing force of armed officers with the same or similar authorities as officers of federal law enforcement agencies within DOJ. Consolidating responsibility for the conduct of federal enforcement officers, such as through applying attorney general guidelines to their operations and tactics, could add a layer of moderation, consistency, and accountability that legislation cannot accomplish on its own. (For more on this, see Carrie Cordero’s report Reforming the Department of Homeland Security Through Enhanced Oversight & Accountability.)

Ultimately, most legislators and voters would probably agree that effective civil immigration enforcement is necessary, even if they disagree about the volume, pace, and targeting criteria of such enforcement. As enforcement operations have increased or become more prominent in the public eye, it is reasonable to seek to bring them in line with other applications of official force. But proposals to reform enforcement practices should be clear in their goals. If Congress wishes to limit the scope, purpose, targeting, or frequency of enforcement actions, it should do so directly, and not by adopting measures that will simply make immigration enforcement less effective. Rather, they should emphasize professionalism, accountability, and clarity in a manner similar to what the public expects of the law enforcement community.

Pending Proposals

Separately, the Uniform Standards Protection Act of 2025, introduced September 26, 2025, as H.R. 5581, would prohibit states from requiring federal law enforcement officers to wear uniforms. This bill would effectively preempt state laws prohibiting federal immigration agents from wearing facial coverings, such as the proposed Rhode Island Community Protection Act, S. 2608 (introduced February 13, 2026).

About the Author

David Aaron is a former Manhattan assistant district attorney and Department of Justice national security and cyber prosecutor. He is now in private practice at an AmLaw 50 law firm and is a visiting professor at Wesleyan University.

About the Series

Building on its prior work on issues at the intersection of federalism, national security, domestic deployment, and law enforcement activities, the CNAS National Security Law Program is publishing a commentary series that assesses the legal and policy considerations for improving the framework governing law enforcement use of military uniforms and gear. Read more about the series here.

The CNAS project on federalism and national security was initiated with support from the Democracy Innovation Fund, Defending Democracy Together Institute. Continued work on domestic deployment and related issues has been made possible by support from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

About the Center for a New American Security

As a research and policy institution committed to the highest standards of organizational, intellectual, and personal integrity, CNAS maintains strict intellectual independence and sole editorial direction and control over its ideas, projects, publications, events, and other research activities. CNAS does not take institutional positions on policy issues, and the content of CNAS publications reflects the views of their authors alone. In keeping with its mission and values, CNAS does not engage in lobbying activity and complies fully with all applicable federal, state, and local laws. CNAS will not engage in any representational activities or advocacy on behalf of any entities or interests and, to the extent that the Center accepts funding from non-U.S. sources, its activities will be limited to bona fide scholastic, academic, and research-related activities, consistent with applicable federal law. The Center publicly acknowledges on its website annually all donors who contribute.

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