Eyes in the Sky

Airborne sensing and battle management aircraft are critical enablers of U.S. air superiority. At the tactical level, their rapid collection, synthesis, and transmission of information across units can separate successful missions from failed or more difficult ones.¹ More broadly, air battle management platforms’ ability to work across units and provide imperfect but shared information fosters unity of effort and creates significant operational advantages.² For generations, dedicated sensing and battle management aircraft have fulfilled this “quarterback” role, nimbly providing critical situational awareness and real-time coordination that turns individual sorties into a dominant force.³

Airborne sensing and air battle management are distinct but intertwined tasks. Airborne sensing is the use of aircraft sensors to detect, identify, and track potential threats or targets for U.S. forces.⁴ Air battle management is the tasking and retasking of air units by air battle managers in response to live changes in the battlespace.⁵ As U.S. joint doctrine has stated, battle management is the act of determining “where, when, and with which force to apply capabilities against specific threats.”⁶ Critically, battle managers rely on sensors and communications links to inform and disseminate their decisions. For the purposes of this report’s focus, “air battle management” (ABM) inclusively refers to both the sensing and the battle management functions undertaken by dedicated aircraft and their crews.⁷

Since the Korean War, ABM has traditionally involved airborne sensors and battle managers collocated in common aircraft such as the E-2 Hawkeye, E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control system (AWACS), or E-7 Wedgetail.⁸ However, these sensing and battle management components can be disaggregated, and today, as new adversary capabilities challenge the survivability of large and difficult-to-maintain ABM aircraft, the future of dedicated ABM platforms is uncertain.⁹

Rather than commit to the E-7 Wedgetail, a new dedicated ABM platform, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is currently pursuing a “bridge” strategy of procuring smaller numbers of E-2Ds while exploring sensing and battle management options on fighter-based networks, ground-based centers, and space-based sensors.¹⁰ These alternatives and their advocates suggest that dedicated ABM may be less relevant or perhaps obsolete in the future battlespace, and that space, fighter, or ground systems are natural successors.¹¹

Contrary to these trends, dedicated ABM aircraft should be treated as an indispensable asset for U.S. military operations today and for the foreseeable future. Highly mobile and able to bridge combat units on the tactical edge with higher-level operational command centers, ABM aircraft support an essential middle tier of command not easily replaced by tactical aircraft, ground centers, or satellites. Moreover, in an increasingly diverse and complicated threat environment, ABM aircraft provide an unmatched blend of capability and flexibility to identify novel threats and accelerate response times. The DoD’s priority scenarios—a U.S.-China conflict and homeland defense—highlight these enduring value propositions for ABM.

Alternatives to ABM should be seen as eventual complements rather than viable near-term substitutes. While emerging technologies and threats pose new challenges to ABM, these threats are mitigable, and proposed alternatives are either longer-term technological prospects, unproven at or incapable of battle management, highly vulnerable, or a combination of the three. Once fielded at scale, these capabilities should complement ABM aircraft to create a more resilient and robust command and control architecture better suited to effectively operating in priority threat scenarios.

This report begins by examining the primary roles for and challenges to ABM in the DoD’s priority scenarios: a U.S.-China conflict and homeland defense operations.¹² In light of those roles and challenges, the report then interrogates the merits of proposed alternatives to ABM. It then ultimately makes the case for ABM’s enduring value in those priority scenarios, and considers how ABM aircraft could retain their effectiveness and work with complementary capabilities in the near future. The report concludes with implications for the DoD’s priority planning scenarios and beyond, and offers recommendations for DoD planners and policymakers. A summary table captures the report’s main findings and arguments in the appendix.

Airborne Sensing and Battle Management in Priority Scenarios

The DoD’s National Defense Strategy points to a “denial defense” in the Indo-Pacific and homeland defense as its top priorities.¹³ These scenarios present markedly different demands and challenges for ABM assets. A U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan would require ABM to support both offensive strike and defensive counterair operations amid regular communications disruptions, whereas ABM’s homeland defense role would primarily support air surveillance and defensive counterair missions in a more permissive environment and against a wider variety of possible threats. This section examines ABM’s roles and challenges in both scenarios.

Roles and Challenges in a U.S.-China Conflict

In a U.S.-China conflict, ABM aircraft would serve to provide cohesion amid chaos. As U.S. strike packages pursue their missions, forward-flying ABM aircraft would offer critical early threat detection and would orchestrate aircraft in response to live adversary developments.¹⁴ The depth of China’s counterair threat and the likelihood of communications disruptions make ABM aircrafts’ ability to identify threats early, retask aircraft in real time, and serve as a mid-level communications link fundamental to maintaining unity and continuity of effort.¹⁵ ABM platforms would play the important role of helping execute air tasking orders not just as initially planned, but dynamically and in response to live problems China’s armed forces present.¹⁶

However, China has developed the ability to “sack” the quarterback and in doing so drastically undermine U.S. air operations. The challenges to ABM platforms in a U.S.-China conflict scenario can be distilled into three main groups: air vulnerability, ground vulnerability, and communications disruptions. Chinese forces—its large fleet of fighters, dense network of maritime and ground-based air defenses, and missile forces—will concentrate on destroying U.S. ABM aircraft in the air and on runways.¹⁷ At the same time, Chinese forces will likely also engage in space and electromagnetic attacks as well as cyberattacks to disrupt sensors and communications networks, further challenging ABM’s effectiveness.¹⁸

In the air, U.S. sensing and battle management platforms are vulnerable because of their highly visible radar cross section and electronic signature.¹⁹ U.S. ABM aircrafts’ shape and actively emitting radar allow adversary ABM and other sensors to detect them from extended distances.²⁰ China’s robust air-to-air capabilities, namely its long-range sensors and expanding fleet of fifth-generation fighters and long-range air-to-air missiles, are designed to target these high-value U.S. aircraft.²¹ Armed with PL-15 or possibly PL-17 missiles, People’s Liberation Army Air Force fighters are equipped to shoot down U.S. ABM aircraft from well over 100 miles away, while Chinese sea- and ground-based air defenses threaten any American aircraft in their engagement envelope.²² As a result, ABM aircraft in the Indo-Pacific will be forced to navigate contested and dangerous airspace.

On the ground, China’s long-range missiles can target U.S. airbases and could destroy ABM aircraft before they can take off.²³ While parked, ABM platforms are soft, fragile targets easily damaged or destroyed by ballistic missiles armed with submunitions, of which China fields a deep arsenal.²⁴ The Joint Force has sought to mitigate the Chinese threat to U.S. bases by adopting more distributed basing postures, but these concepts are difficult to sustain and most ABM aircraft are ill-suited to austere basing environments due to their extended runway needs and unique equipment requirements.²⁵ The E-2 may be an exception as its carrier-focused design enables more flexible takeoff and landing options.²⁶ Nevertheless, the Chinese missile threat in the Indo-Pacific places most of the United States’ existing and planned ABM fleet at risk in forward basing locations.²⁷ Instead, they will need to either fly from distant bases with the support of tankers or move to closer bases after the threat has dissipated.

As ABM aircraft are physically held at risk, so too is their primary means to execute their mission via communications links. Nonkinetic Chinese capabilities threaten U.S. radars, data links, and communications systems, and kinetic strikes against communications satellites could further degrade an ABM aircraft’s ability to connect with the forces it manages. These challenges may require ABM assets to operate closer to or even within the line of sight of the aircraft they control, yet in doing so, ABM aircraft would be increasingly exposed to the aforementioned kinetic vulnerabilities, thus creating a tension between positioning and performance.²⁸

ABM aircrafts’ role as an air operations quarterback in the Indo-Pacific is ultimately an essential but difficult one. Chinese forces are designed and prepared to target U.S. airborne sensing and battle management platforms across domains to generate broader disarray. However, as the following sections examine, ABM platforms can adjust to and address these operational challenges, whereas proposed sensing and battle management alternatives are years, if not decades, away from fielding, and may lead to even greater operational difficulties.

Roles and Challenges in Homeland Defense

In defending the homeland, ABM assets would support targeted detection and warning for air-launched ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones. While a wide variety of ballistic missile threats new and old menace the homeland, ABM aircraft are best equipped to specifically address air-launched missiles as well as slower and low-flying, air-breathing threats. ABM deployments would play a key role in filling coverage gaps or supplementing existing sensors to bolster air surveillance in moments of urgency. Additionally, ABM aircraft would play a valuable role in integrating and orchestrating air surveillance systems and air defense responses across homeland defense agencies. In defending U.S. airspace, ABM platforms ultimately contribute an important air surveillance and mission integration capability.

ABM’s challenges in homeland defense lie less in potential adversary disruption of U.S. air operations and more in the difficulty of the missions themselves. Detecting, identifying, and tracking air-launched ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones across a large geographic area stresses ABM’s sensing and capacity limits, and requires careful prioritization and consideration of cost. Additionally, integrating sensors, decision-makers, and responders to effectively defend against homeland air threats will require bridging otherwise siloed organizations and capabilities.

Air-launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles present some of the most serious challenges to air surveillance due to the difficulties with detecting these threats in time for a response. Compared to ground-launched ballistic missiles, which have clear launch signatures and relatively predictable launch sites, air-launched ballistic missiles may begin their flight path at unpredictable locations, making detection and a timely response by ABM or other assets more challenging.²⁹ Cruise missiles pose an even more stressing challenge: Unlike a ballistic missile’s high-altitude and parabolic trajectory, lower-altitude cruise missiles hug the earth’s surface, making detection more difficult due to their ability to “hide” behind the earth’s curvature and avoid distant sensors.³⁰ This particular attribute allows air-launched cruise missiles to be launched closer to their targets, further reducing possible response time.

Once detected, positively identifying and tracking cruise missiles presents another challenge in the form of background clutter over both land and sea.³¹ The problem of clutter also applies to slow- and low-flying drones, as evidenced in drone warfare in Ukraine and beyond.³² Ground vehicles and terrain features such as valleys, mountains, or waves can confuse sensors or mask airborne objects entirely, complicating identification and target-quality tracking.³³ Cruise missiles and drones thus pose major detection and tracking problems for homeland air surveillance, including for ABM sensors.

Additionally, the sheer size of the U.S. homeland and the number of potential targets an adversary might seek to strike create a larger prioritization challenge. In which areas should ABM assets be deployed to focus their efforts? Compared to stationary sensors like radar towers or ground-based radars, ABM assets are cost- and labor-intensive to operate, and cannot fly indefinitely. ABM aircraft’s role in homeland defense will therefore be defined by important prioritization and resource allocation decisions about which geographic areas require additional support and when that support is needed.³⁴

Finally, generating time-sensitive responses to short-notice homeland air threats confronts the challenge of rapidly connecting disparate and overstretched sensors and actors. U.S. civil and military agencies and their sensing tools are not consistently integrated to support real-time surveillance and response for homeland defense.³⁵ Moreover, existing homeland response options comprise a limited quantity of ground-based fighter aircraft and some surface-to-air systems over the National Capital Region.³⁶ Particularly in the case of cruise missiles, these response options would likely struggle to takeoff and intercept threats in time without several minutes of warning.³⁷ Given these dilemmas, responding to homeland air threats once detected is an interagency and cross-platform coordination problem in its own right.

ABM’s role in homeland defense is ultimately challenged by the complexity and scale of the homeland threat landscape, and the coordination challenges involved with mustering timely responses. The following sections demonstrate that while a wide variety of assets beyond ABM will also be needed to bolster long-standing coverage gaps in homeland air defense, ABM platforms will also play an important role in reinforcing and integrating these missions.

Understanding Alternatives to Airborne Sensing and Battle Management

Facing the above operational challenges, the DoD is exploring a number of alternatives to ABM. A leading alternative lies in space-based airborne moving target indication (AMTI), which aims to expand coverage and eventually accelerate data transmission through constellations of low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites. The satellites would provide air target tracking with combinations of synthetic aperture radar and rapid communications systems.³⁸ Satellites in proliferated LEO constellations would provide significant air and ground target coverage, though high Earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit would also provide targeted and, in some cases, more resilient coverage. A major proposed advantage of satellite sensors is their potential for proliferated and persistent coverage.³⁹ In theory, they might in the future also support real-time or near-real-time target-quality data sharing among forward units and a distant command and control center, though this capability has yet to be proven.⁴⁰

A second model involves distributed, fighter-based systems designed to make ABM possible in the absence of legacy, dedicated ABM aircraft. This model envisions fifth- and future sixth-generation aircraft and their pilots as battle managers empowered by their aircraft’s advanced sensing and data networking capabilities.⁴¹ In this approach, crewed fighters exercise decentralized command authority over other units including uncrewed autonomous aircraft called collaborative combat aircraft (CCA), and allocate and re-task units as appropriate to their mission.⁴² In theory, this alternative provides a more dynamic and resilient approach to ABM that may be well-suited to contested operations in the Indo-Pacific.

A third alternative involves ground-based sensing and battle management centers such as Control and Reporting Centers (CRCs), which are already active in the United States and abroad.⁴³ CRCs integrate data from air-, sea-, space-, and land-based sensors, and provide a ground-based ABM function. Ground-based sensors and battle management systems like CRC have been employed in operations in the Middle East, and also contribute to homeland defense operations like Noble Eagle in the United States.⁴⁴

While space-, fighter-, and ground-based capability sets are valuable complements to ABM aircraft and will play important roles in the DoD’s priority scenarios, none are viable near-term substitutes for ABM in their own right. Neither space- nor fighter- nor ground-based systems currently offer both the sensor attributes and the battle management capacity to replace ABM in the Indo-Pacific and in homeland defense missions. Moreover, over-indexing on either alternative as a near-term substitute risks exposing the Joint Force to even deeper vulnerabilities.

Space-Based AMTI

In both priority scenarios, overreliance on space as the primary or only source of sensing and communications is a fraught proposition. Space-based AMTI systems will face challenges supporting real-time ABM due to the physics of revisit rates and data transmission. LEO satellites, where the vast majority of surveillance satellites reside, must revisit a target continually to provide up-to-date information and therefore can only provide data as current as the constellation’s most recent visit.⁴⁵ Depending on the constellation size and target area, these revisit rates can be measured in extended periods of time.⁴⁶ This time-sensitivity problem is compounded by the latency of data transmission from space: The distance between satellites and receivers, the amount of data sent, and limited transmission bandwidth all drive latency up to several minutes or more before an operator can receive critical information.⁴⁷

In a war with China and in defense of the homeland, U.S. forces cannot pause their operations and wait for slow or degraded satellite communications.⁴⁸ They will require real-time target information to detect and track potential airborne threats simultaneously or in quick succession, and also to select and queue options to interdict each threat in a coordinated response.⁴⁹ At present and for the foreseeable future, space-based AMTI trackers lack the capability to deliver this kind of threat information in real time.⁵⁰

It must also be emphasized that satellite sensors are not battle managers, and battle managers will still be needed even in the event of a mature space-based AMTI capability.⁵¹ Space Force officials have emphasized that even when initial space-based AMTI transmission capabilities are fielded in the 2030s, airborne complements will remain integral to the air tracking mission due to their superior sensor resolution, ability to fuse information and rapidly assess battlefield conditions, and ability to rapidly communicate with in-flight aircraft.⁵² While satellites may capture and transmit valuable data, synthesizing information, assessing and modifying plans, and communicating changes in real time are core battle management functions that satellites do not yet provide in the present nor in the near- to medium-term future.⁵³

Additionally, overreliance on satellites as the Joint Force’s primary sensing and communications source increases vulnerability in an already-contested domain and incentivizes adversary attacks on U.S. satellites. Indeed, the existing counterspace capabilities of China and other U.S. adversaries already pose major risks to U.S. satellites in LEO and beyond.⁵⁴ In March 2025, then-Vice Chief of Space Operations General Michael Guetlein described Chinese satellites as capable of “space dogfighting,” using grappling arms or other on-orbit antisatellite (ASAT) weapons.⁵⁵ China and Russia both field ground-based lasers and electromagnetic weapons designed to jam and disrupt satellite operations, as well as established direct-ascent ASAT missile capabilities.⁵⁶ While the Space Force intends to deploy resilient, highly proliferated AMTI constellations as quickly as possible, this is a years-long endeavor that is not likely to be achieved in the near term.⁵⁷ In the meantime, the risk of larger-scale space degradation from nonkinetic effects, debris fields, or nuclear use in space further highlight the need for terrestrial sensing and communications platforms in addition to space-based ones.⁵⁸

Even as the United States proliferates its LEO constellations in the medium and long term, U.S. adversaries understand space’s integral role in the American way of war and will not stand idle.⁵⁹ Russia and China will continue to explore countermeasures to disrupt or destroy proliferated U.S. space assets, as evidenced by Russia’s development of an on-orbit nuclear weapon that could destroy immense swaths of LEO constellations irrespective of proliferation levels.⁶⁰ China is also developing a host of new kinetic and nonkinetic counterspace options designed to degrade LEO constellations.⁶¹ Unlike recent decades of U.S. space dominance, the future balance of space power will be dynamic and highly susceptible to asymmetric disruptions from adversaries.⁶² Relying solely on space-based sensors is a strategic and operational gamble the United States cannot afford.

Fighter-Based Battle Management

The second model of a distributed, fighter-based approach decentralizes battle management down to fighters to enhance tactical-level performance, but in doing so risks sacrificing unity of effort. While a fighter-based battle management capability provides a valuable backstop in a U.S.-China conflict and permits greater coordination in more contested airspace, its more limited sensor ranges and integration capability complement, not replace, dedicated ABM over the Indo-Pacific or the homeland.

The fundamental challenge lies in fighters’ shorter sensor and communications ranges and thus their limitations in aggregating enough disparate sensor pictures into a truly unified common operator picture (COP). While exact radar ranges are classified, ABM aircraft offer rotating 360-degree coverage over ranges of several hundred miles, track hundreds of targets, and integrate and synthesize numerous sensor inputs.⁶³ By comparison, fixed fighter sensors cover ranges of 100–200 miles, track fewer targets, and lack the same data processing capability to fuse and transmit shared inputs into a COP.⁶⁴ CCA radars will likely be even less capable due to the drones’ smaller sizes and the CCA program’s efforts to keep costs down.⁶⁵ Even if fighters’ sensors can eventually be networked with CCAs or other aircraft, limited datalink bandwidth and transmission ranges are a major barrier to maintaining a real-time COP.⁶⁶ Relative to dedicated ABM platforms, fighters are only able to achieve smaller and higher-latency slices of situational awareness while managing subordinate units at more limited ranges.⁶⁷

In addition to important hardware limitations, fighters also lack the crew members to dynamically manage air operations. Dedicated ABM crews, which include as many as 19 specialized operators in an E-7, handle enormous volumes of information not just from the aircraft’s own sensors but from satellite communications, radio transmissions, Link 16, and more, while also deciding which data is then directed to other platforms.⁶⁸ In the future, AI may help fighter pilots synthesize data from multiple sources and make faster decisions, but even in an AI-enabled future, fighters will lack the combination of hardware and dedicated personnel to simultaneously execute their primary mission while also absorbing and directing information across the entire battlespace.

This personnel limitation fundamentally constrains the scale of battle management fighter pilots can achieve and makes it unlikely that a distributed network of individual fighters will aggregate into a COP and a unified operational effort without a dedicated ABM crew’s support. Particularly in the vast geographic areas of the Indo-Pacific and the U.S. homeland, a narrower scope of awareness paired with broader command responsibility is more likely to risk undermining the pilot’s own mission or lead the pilot to task and reallocate subordinate units out of sync with operational developments outside the fighter’s area. If ABM aircraft are not available, fighters may serve as battle managers for highly stressing missions or as stopgaps, but they are not yet well-equipped to serve as first-string battle management options.⁶⁹

Fifth- and sixth-generation fighters’ sensor and networking capabilities, while a significant improvement over previous generations, are ultimately more limited than those of dedicated ABM platforms.⁷⁰ As a result, even networked combat aircraft will possess a narrower view of the battlefield and will struggle to effectively direct broader air operations. In a high-intensity U.S.-China conflict, intermittent fighter-based battle management may be unavoidable and thus may serve as an important backstop when satellite communications are disrupted or when dedicated ABM aircraft are unavailable. However, a distributed fighter-based model poses significant battle management limitations and should not be the preferred first option given dedicated ABM aircrafts’ potential to orchestrate forces across a wider range and with greater awareness.

Ground-Based Sensing and Battle Management

Ground-based sensors and battle management systems play an important role in priority defense scenarios, but again are distinct from and not viable replacements for dedicated ABM aircraft. Ground-based systems may conduct air battle management from outside of contested airspace, alleviate some of the survivability concerns associated with ABM employment, and, in some cases, achieve significant sensing range.⁷¹ However, in the homeland, most ground-based sensing and battle management systems are not optimally positioned to both detect and initiate responses to air-breathing threats. Moreover, in a high-end Indo-Pacific conflict, ground-based battle managers would be just as vulnerable to attack as their ABM counterparts.

Ground-based sensors are constrained by two fundamental limitations—fixed positions that create coverage gaps and power limitations that restrict detection ranges. Because of cruise missiles’ ability to fly at lower altitudes and avoid detection behind the earth’s curvature, smaller tactical radars are not well-positioned to achieve detection ranges for more than a few minutes of warning time.⁷² Such a window effectively precludes a defensive response by any fighter aircraft and would place defensive onus on surface-to-air missiles or point defenses.⁷³ Using tower-based sensors, significant power generation, or both, over-the-horizon radars (OTHR) can achieve significantly greater range.⁷⁴ However, they are still constrained by their fixed locations, which can lead to predictable seams for adversary planners to exploit.⁷⁵ Extending these ranges and complicating adversary plans to avoid detection will likely require additional layers of sensors, including airborne sensors such as ABM or even aerostats, to improve detection and warning time for U.S. forces mustering a defensive response.⁷⁶

Moreover, ground-based sensing and battle management systems’ relative lack of mobility makes them equally if not more vulnerable in a high-end conflict than their ABM counterparts. China’s ballistic and cruise missile arsenal is well-equipped to strike fixed and soft targets like ground-based radars throughout the First and Second Island Chains.⁷⁷ Ground-based sensors and battle management systems, therefore, provide limited compensation for ABM aircrafts’ survivability challenges in a U.S.-China conflict.

Ground-based systems do possess significant merits: they play a key role in detecting and tracking orbital threats from ballistic missiles as well as other long-range, high-altitude air threats.⁷⁸ Higher-end systems like OTHR can also significantly increase radar coverage and warning time within their geographic areas, and in the U.S. homeland, ground-based sensing and battle management centers are not as constrained by access and survivability concerns as they are in the Indo-Pacific. However, it is both infeasible and undesirable to place OTHR and early warning radars in a full perimeter across the United States, and lower-altitude threats will require additional detection and response capabilities. As with fighter-based and space-based sensors, ground-based systems are best viewed as complements to ABM rather than replacements.

Complements, Not Substitutes

Dedicated ABM aircraft, space-based AMTI, fighter-based battle management, and ground-based systems are mutually supporting complements. While space-based AMTI satellites still lack the capability to transmit real-time target information, their potential for global coverage remains an essential asset to bolster mission planning and widen an air battle manager’s intelligence picture. Although fighter-based systems do not match the sensing and battle management capability of dedicated ABM aircraft, they enable smaller force elements to independently execute their mission in a degraded and contested communications environment. And while ground-based systems are not mobile and may struggle to identify and track lower-flying cruise missiles, their extended ranges provide valuable increases in warning time, and they can pair with ABM aircraft to further bolster sensor coverage. Together, these systems offer valuable redundancy and resiliency that collectively bolster air domain awareness and command and control of air operations.

With these complementary capabilities in mind, the following section makes the case for ABM aircraft’s enduring operational value in the DoD’s priority scenarios and beyond.

The Enduring Relevance of Airborne Sensing and Battle Management

ABM aircraft generate vital connective tissue and flexibility for the Joint Force. Foregoing these contributions would undermine the fighting force’s effectiveness in high-end conflicts and beyond, and leave the United States less nimble and capable of responding to threats to U.S. airspace. Moving forward, ABM aircrafts’ part in sensing and air battle management missions is essential to bolstering deterrence and defense across multiple scenarios and time horizons.⁷⁹

In a U.S.-China conflict, ABM aircraft make U.S. air operations more resilient and effective. Without ABM aircraft surveilling and directing air missions in the Indo-Pacific, U.S. forces could be surprised and ambushed by Chinese aircraft.⁸⁰ Indeed, the scale of expected threats and disruptions in this conflict places a premium on forward air battle managers that can bolster situational awareness and deftly redirect aircraft in a rapidly changing battlespace.⁸¹ Moreover, given the high probability that communications are degraded in an Indo-Pacific conflict, limiting connectivity to higher command echelons, ABM aircraft offer the most capable remaining command and control node for broader air operations.⁸² The operational value as both an “eye in the sky” and a “nerve center” has been proven time and again in high- and low-intensity conflicts alike, and will equally apply to a U.S.-China conflict.⁸³

Although ABM aircraft will be at high risk in a U.S.-China conflict, these risks can be mitigated to reduce vulnerability and enable continued contributions from ABM aircraft. Proven adjustments exist to make ABM aircraft more survivable.⁸⁴ ABM aircraft often operate with escorts and looking forward, they could employ uncrewed systems, such as CCA, to expand both protection and sensing capability.⁸⁵ Instead of continuously operating forward, ABM aircraft could intermittently fly into contested airspace to support pulsed U.S. offensive operations. Such adaptations will never be perfect, and planners in a great power war will need to weigh and manage the risks associated with a given ABM mission as with the employment of any other aircraft.⁸⁶ Nevertheless, ABM employment is both necessary and achievable for U.S. air operations in the Indo-Pacific.

Over the homeland, ABM aircrafts’ clearest value lies in their flexibility to bolster sensing and coordinate a response to air-launched threats. The bulk of current U.S. homeland air surveillance is ground-based, designed to detect medium- and high-altitude aircraft and missiles, and primarily focuses on threats traveling over the North Pole, with little to no dedicated assets to track cruise missiles or aircraft from other directions.⁸⁷ This arrangement leaves a major gap in low-altitude threat detection and tracking. While OTHR are in development that will expand detection range, airborne sensors provide the capability to confirm and track lower-altitude threats like cruise missiles and drones more precisely, and ABM aircraft in particular also provide a dedicated battle management crew to queue response options accordingly.⁸⁸

Because ABM assets are costly to operate and few in number, a likely role for ABM aircraft in homeland defense entails acting in a “surge” capacity to bolster coverage quality over critical areas or to address relative blind spots.⁸⁹ As the known, fixed location of most U.S. and Canadian ground-based sensors invites adversaries to identify and exploit seams, airborne sensors can and should serve as “gap fillers” in moments of urgency to provide more comprehensive coverage and complicate adversary planning.⁹⁰ The mobility of ABM aircraft is well-suited to surging in moments of need, and their sensors are designed to provide overhead coverage for low-altitude missiles and drones.⁹¹

In this “surge” context, ABM aircraft not only increase warning time, but also offer the capability to orchestrate quicker responses to homeland threats. While thorough coordination is necessary to ensure proper command and control and positive identification of threats, homeland civil and military sensor networks reportedly remain disparate and lack well-integrated communications and information sharing, a shortcoming that likely generates dangerous response time delays.⁹² In a surge role, ABM aircraft provide the option for airborne battle managers to directly queue responders, be they nearby combat aircraft, ground-based interceptors, or other defensive systems, rather than rely on a more time-intensive “telephone” process that has historically characterized homeland defense.⁹³ In doing so, ABM aircraft can optimize the United States’ defensive response time, a crucial variable to ensure threats are defeated once identified.⁹⁴

Taken together, while space-, fighter-, and surface-based systems make important contributions to a layered sensing architecture, they cannot substitute for dedicated ABM. ABM aircraft and their crews generate situational awareness with more resolution and responsiveness than satellites and most ground-based radars, over a wider area than fighters can monitor, while coordinating action and distributing information that improves operational outcomes. In the Indo-Pacific, these attributes markedly improve the survivability and effectiveness of air operations, and over the homeland, ABM’s capacity to surge into areas of need directly benefits warning and response time.

In addition, ABM aircrafts’ relevance goes beyond the United States’ priority threats, especially in the near term. In the Middle East, Houthi missile strikes in 2024 and 2025 spotlighted carrier-based E-2s acting as “nerve centers” for countering drone and missile strikes, and February 2026 preparations for Operation Epic Fury—the strikes against Iran—saw the United States commit over half of its estimated available E-3 fleet to the region.⁹⁵ Meanwhile in Europe, U.S. and NATO E-3s and Australian E-7s have responded to Russian aircraft and drone incursions, and have also supported Ukrainian air domain awareness.⁹⁶ As cheaper and more accessible drones and missiles comprise a larger share of the global threat picture, ABM fleets will represent an increasingly important capability to identify and nimbly respond to lower priority challenges.

Without an airborne sensing and battle management layer, the DoD risks opening or worsening dangerous gaps in the Joint Force’s ability to manage threats and mount cohesive responses in priority scenarios. This gap is already acute in the near term, as a small and aging ABM fleet risks being ill-prepared to meet wartime demands in the Indo-Pacific, and adversaries are attempting to exploit long-standing gaps in homeland air defense. In both cases and beyond, the Joint Force needs dedicated ABM platforms to support situational awareness and unity of effort.

Recommendations

Airborne sensing and battle management platforms’ primary contributions to the Joint Force—fostering unity of effort and connectivity—remain as relevant as ever to the United States’ priority scenarios and beyond. The following recommendations aim to guide senior policymakers and planners in the Department of Defense and Congress as they grapple with the future of U.S. ABM.

Recommendations for the Department of Defense

Reinterrogate total force requirements for ABM aircraft for priority scenarios and allocate resources to meet requirements. Declining mission capable rates have shrunk the U.S. ABM fleet well below target, and a future high-intensity conflict would further divide the fleet between homeland defense and forward operations. The department should reconsider its total warfighting requirement for ABM platforms, ensure the requirement accounts for managing both priority scenarios simultaneously, and build enough airborne capabilities to satisfy future sensing and battle management demand.

Wargame and test ABM operations in a war with China to inform new approaches to ABM employment in a high-intensity conflict. These tabletop exercises (TTXs) should test the effectiveness of air operations with and without different degrees of ABM employment, test the potential efficacy of different ABM escort packages to increase ABM survivability, and consider how command and threat information would flow to and from units in a disrupted environment. These TTXs should inform future ABM employment and capability development.

Consider how ABM aircraft can contribute to Golden Dome as new capabilities come online over time. While Golden Dome’s planned composition remains unannounced, the likely construction of several new radar systems and interceptor capabilities require the DoD to consider how these new elements will integrate with other aspects of homeland defense. The DoD should examine Golden Dome plans for opportunities in which ABM aircraft can optimize sensing and response options, including but not limited to integration with ground-based interceptors and new ground-based radar systems.

Continue to develop artificial intelligence (AI) systems and autonomous aircraft to support airborne sensing and battle management. Integrating AI systems and autonomous sensing aircraft can reduce information burdens on ABM operators by accelerating data processing and improving sensing capability. Uncrewed and autonomous sensing platforms may increase the ABM fleet’s sensor reach and sensor diversity, helping increase the situational awareness and effectiveness of air operations.

Maintain a robust ABM pilot and crew pipeline. Imminent retirement of ABM aircraft threatens to undermine battle management expertise as crew members retire or are moved to other posts. In addition to continuing to resource the procurement and maintenance of ABM aircraft, maintaining a strong talent pool and training pipeline for ABM operators is necessary to sustain the U.S. battle management community, particularly as space-based and AI alternatives are not yet mature enough to offset personnel losses.

Recommendations for Congress

Continue to authorize and appropriate funding for ABM programs to prevent capability gaps and create resiliency. Attempts by the DoD to cancel ABM programs, such as the E-7, risk creating significant capability gaps in the near to medium term. While the DoD’s current bridging strategy brings a small number of additional E-2Ds into the force over a short time frame, this is only a stopgap measure and likely insufficient to meet requirements for homeland defense, a war with China, as well as lower priority security challenges. To ensure sufficient capacity over time, Congress must continually authorize and appropriate funding for new ABM procurement.

Fund dedicated ABM programs through and beyond the fielding of space-based AMTI systems. Space-based AMTI satellites cannot replace ABM aircraft—they are sensors and possess no battle management capability. Moreover, adversary counterspace capabilities hold U.S. satellites at serious risk. Dispensing with ABM aircraft in favor of unproven space-based assets would simplify adversary planning and expose the Joint Force to major vulnerabilities. Congress must ensure that U.S. forces retain sensing and communication capabilities in the likely event that space assets become temporarily unavailable.

Require the DoD to report on its near-term plans for sensor coverage and battle management in Indo-Pacific and homeland defense scenarios. The DoD should be able to identify its planned sources of sensing and battle management in both scenarios, articulate how situational awareness and unity of effort will be maintained in contested and challenging threat environments, and identify and justify ABM assets’ planned roles in these contingencies. Members of Congress and their staff should push DoD officials to articulate how the Joint Force plans to collect, fuse, and share data; maintain and protect ABM operations; and ensure resilient communications to generate vital situational awareness and adaptive battle management in these scenarios.

Appendix: Summary Table

About the Author

Philip Sheers is an associate fellow with the Defense Program at CNAS. He focuses on nuclear deterrence, airpower, great power conflict, and defense budget and defense industrial base issues. Sheers also supports the CNAS Gaming Lab. Prior to joining CNAS, he worked as a risk analyst at Ipsos Public Affairs. Sheers holds an MA in security studies from Georgetown University and a BA in international studies from Kenyon College. His writing and research have been featured in Foreign Policy, Breaking Defense, and The Economist.

About the Defense Program

Over the past 19 years, CNAS has defined the future of U.S. defense strategy. Building on this legacy, the CNAS Defense Program team continues to develop high-level concepts and concrete recommendations to ensure U.S. military preeminence into the future and to reverse the erosion of U.S. military advantages vis-à-vis China and, to a lesser extent, Russia. Specific areas of study include concentrating on great power competition, developing a force structure and innovative operational concepts adapted for this more challenging era, and making hard choices to effect necessary change.

Acknowledgments

I am especially grateful to Stacie Pettyjohn for the opportunity to tackle this topic, for continually encouraging me to take on new areas of study in the U.S.-China problem set, and for her guidance and feedback throughout this research. I also would not have been able to complete this work without Becca Wasser, Andrew Metrick, and Hannah Dennis, my first mentors and sources of encouragement at CNAS. I also thank Maura McCarthy and Emma Swislow for their steadfast editing support, Dr. Karl Mueller for providing tremendous feedback to improve this report, and the numerous subject matter experts who contributed their time and insights to this research. Any errors are the responsibility of the author alone. This report was made possible with general support to the Defense Program.

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