Hellscape for Taiwan

Challenges to Implementation and Recommendations

A crucial first step toward actualizing the Hellscape concept is acquisition of large quantities of uncrewed systems by the Republic of China (Taiwan) Armed Forces. Such uncrewed systems could include, but are not limited to: ⁴

• Long-range one-way attack (kamikaze) drones
• Uncrewed surface vessels (USVs)
• Uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs)
• Multirotor drones
• First-person view (FPV) drones

Additionally, Taiwan should increase and diversify investments in air defense and counter-uncrewed aerial system (C-UAS) capabilities such as:

• Mobile surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)
• Loitering SAMs
• Drone interceptors
• Gun-based drone defenses
• Decoys
• Passive defenses

The Hellscape concept is grounded in Taiwanese self-sufficiency and seeks to identify a theory of victory that is not reliant on the United States. Under President Lai Ching-te, Taiwan has taken major steps to actualize a degree of military-industrial independence by investing in commercial-grade drone production.⁵ However, Taiwan’s drone industrial base is inhibited by high manufacturing costs due to the need for non-PRC supply chains, coupled with technological dependency on allies like the United States.⁶ Taiwan must significantly expand its drone industry and secure reliable supply chains to independently manufacture the drones required for the Hellscape concept.

The authors recommend a dual approach for the continued cultivation of Taiwan’s domestic drone production and the rapid acquisition of more uncrewed technology:

• The Lai administration should amend the special defense budget to allocate more funding for domestic drone production. Procurement should consistently favor large quantities of domestically built uncrewed systems over costly platforms such as fighter jets.
• Taiwanese companies should continue to build relationships with European drone manufacturers and expand the emerging non-PRC drone alliance.

Without clear doctrine and rigorous training, however, even a large drone arsenal cannot translate into an effective operational capability. Taiwan appears to be wedded to traditional drone employment concepts, neglecting creative yet simple kill chains that could better exploit asymmetric advantages against a larger adversary. Taiwan also lacks an overarching theory of victory that links its uncrewed systems with other asymmetric capabilities and explains how, together, they could defeat a PRC attack. The Hellscape concept begins to fill this gap but should be tested and refined.⁷

The Hellscape concept would require Taiwanese defenders to master operations of uncrewed systems across air, sea, and land. The Ministry of National Defense has expanded drone training, but this remains insufficient.⁸ Operational concepts and training are interlinked, and Taiwanese forces need a demanding training regime to execute their military plans effectively:

• President Lai should commission the Ministry of National Defense and the General Staff to review existing operational concepts for drone warfare.
• To assist with the development of new drone warfare concepts, the Ministry of National Defense should establish regular “Drone Labs”—structured innovation sessions that bring together career soldiers, conscripted personnel, and technical experts to rapidly prototype, test, and refine drone tactics.

Introduction

Since 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has considered the island of Taiwan to be an integral part of the mainland People’s Republic of China (PRC), and is committed to unifying with the island through “non-peaceful means” if necessary.⁹ For three decades, the PRC has modernized the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to build a military capable of taking Taiwan by force or compelling it to submit to CCP rule.¹⁰ The PLA boasts the largest navy in the world, including sophisticated warships armed with guided missiles and modern amphibious assault capabilities, thousands of ballistic and cruise missiles that can reach Taiwan, and a modern air force that dwarfs the Taiwanese fleet.¹¹

The likelihood that the CCP decides to invade Taiwan grows as the cross-Strait military balance of power increasingly favors Beijing.¹² CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping has stated that he expects the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027.¹³ While this date is simply an internal benchmark, it demonstrates the seriousness of the threat and the strides that the PLA has made toward realizing this goal.¹⁴ Beijing’s confidence in its capabilities is evidenced by the fact that over the past several years the PLA has increasingly conducted complex and large-scale military operations around Taiwan in an attempt to pressure Taipei.¹⁵

The United States has long maintained a policy of strategic ambiguity about whether it would defend Taiwan.¹⁶ Although President Joe Biden repeatedly affirmed that the United States would come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a Chinese attack, President Donald Trump is more equivocal.¹⁷ Trump has accused Taiwan of stealing the United States’ semiconductor industry, argued Taipei should be paying Washington for its defense, and demanded the island spend 10 percent of its gross domestic product on its military.¹⁸ The Trump administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) opposes unilateral efforts to change Taiwan’s status, and it emphasizes that the U.S. military is focused on defeating aggression in the First Island Chain, where Taiwan occupies a central position.¹⁹ Notably, the 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) makes no explicit mention of Taiwan but reaffirms a “strong denial defense” along the First Island Chain.²⁰ However, the NSS and NDS also stress that “our allies must step up and spend—and more importantly do—much more for collective defense.”²¹ By employing tens of thousands of drones as a part of its asymmetric defensive strategy, Taiwan could satisfy the Trump administration’s demand that Taipei do more and, more importantly, position itself to stand alone if the United States refuses to intervene.

Cheap drones are the ultimate asymmetric capability because they are small, inexpensive, adaptable, and accessible. Ukraine has proven their worth: Drones have enabled a smaller, outgunned force to destroy sophisticated Russian weapons and hold off the larger, better equipped Russian military.²² In the Black Sea, Ukrainian uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) have sunk large Russian warships.²³ Software-defined small first-person view (FPV) drones operate in jammed environments, outmaneuver defenses, and destroy even heavily armored tanks. Commercial quadcopters provide Ukrainian troops situational awareness and help to aim artillery fire, while larger multirotor drones lay mines, drop bombs, and deliver supplies to the front lines. Ultimately, the presence of drones over the front lines has made going on the offensive incredibly difficult and costly. Like Ukraine, the Taiwanese armed forces can employ drones for similar missions in defense of their nation.²⁴

Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, first coined the term hellscape in June 2024, declaring his intention “to turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape” should the PRC invade Taiwan.²⁵ As laid out by Paparo, “hellscape” is an American strategy inspired by the Ukrainians’ use of cheap drones to fend off a larger Russian force. As a first line of defense, Paparo suggests flooding the Strait with uncrewed systems that make the PLA “utterly miserable,” and can help “buy time” for other forces to get in place.²⁶ However, unless U.S. troops are stationed on Taiwan, they would need longer-range drones to counter a PRC invasion—drones that would be more expensive and therefore less numerous.²⁷ Taiwan is better positioned to employ small, cheap drones in its defense, and thus Hellscape is better conceived as a Taiwanese concept for self-defense rather than an American one. President Trump wants allies and partners to take responsibility for their own defense; for Taiwan, a Hellscape concept embedded in an asymmetric self-defense strategy would do exactly that.

This report seeks to answer several core questions. What could a Hellscape concept for Taiwan look like, and how would it fit within Taiwan’s current asymmetric strategy? What capabilities would be needed to create a “hellscape?” How could these capabilities be employed together? Perhaps most importantly, could they stop a PRC invasion force?

This report presents a starting operational concept for a Taiwanese hellscape that combines uncrewed systems from all domains with other asymmetric capabilities to repel a PRC invasion. By using uncrewed aerial, surface, and underwater vehicles in concert with land-based artillery, mines, and mobile air defenses, Taiwan could create a density of cross-domain fires not previously possible, deny the PRC air and sea superiority, and destroy large numbers of PLA forces. This approach offers a possibility of certainly blunting, if not defeating and, even more importantly, deterring a PRC invasion.

This report is divided into four sections. The first section provides an overview of PRC plans and preparations for an invasion of Taiwan. The second section reviews the literature on Taiwan’s asymmetric defense strategy, which currently guides its force development, weapons procurement, and operational planning. The third section outlines the four layers of the maritime and aerial hellscape. The fourth section offers conclusions, identifies potential barriers to implementation, and presents recommendations.