The Russia Stability Tracker

It remains the case that most of the political and economic elite have no choice but to remain loyal to the regime—the cost of voicing disagreement is unacceptably high given extreme repression (see below). However, there are some indicators of friction, or at least growing insecurity, among the economic elite as they compete over a shrinking pool of economic resources. For example, the arrests of several senior figures in the network around the powerful Putin allies Arkady and Boris Rotenberg appear fueled by the war and shrinking resources. It sends the signal that even the elite with close personal relationships to Putin are not immune.

Likewise, the government’s new decree allowing the state to assume temporary control over companies and their assets if authorities determine they have failed to adequately protect critical infrastructure from security threats could allow influential players to use the legislation as a pretext for taking control of smaller companies that struggle to secure their assets, further stoking elite divisions.

There is also evidence of friction between Russia’s increasingly powerful security services and economic and technocratic elites. The Kremlin’s tightening control over the internet—including widespread mobile internet shutdowns and restrictions on Telegram—has negatively impacted Russian businesses and disrupted the work of government officials. These tensions reflect a broader wartime tradeoff: Security services are increasingly prioritizing regime and national security even when doing so imposes economic and political costs, generating friction in the system.

The Kremlin has continued its efforts to increase control over Russia’s information environment. Authorities have intensified restrictions on Telegram and VPNs, while rolling mobile internet shutdowns—ostensibly intended to protect against Ukrainian drone attacks—have further constrained Russians’ access to information. Combined with the regime’s long-standing control over television and repression of independent media, these measures leave the Kremlin with formidable tools to shape how Russians understand the war.

At the same time, Ukraine’s increasing strikes inside Russia weaken the Kremlin’s ability to control perceptions of the war. Explosions from Ukrainian strikes on Russian soil and especially the long lines at petrol stations cannot be hidden from the public. Social media is now full of posts and videos recording queues that last for hours and stretch for miles. As more Russians experience firsthand the consequences of the war, the gap between the Kremlin’s preferred narrative and Russians’ lived experience is becoming harder to manage. Thus, while the regime’s control over the information environment remains strong, the war’s increasingly tangible effects inside Russia are calling into question the effectiveness of that control.

Economic conditions have deteriorated as the wartime economic boom has given way to stagnation. Russia’s economy is expected to grow by no more than 1 percent in 2026, while persistently high inflation and interest rates continue to strain businesses and households. Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries have compounded these pressures, producing gasoline shortages and long lines while increasing transportation and logistics costs. Russians are also cutting back on discretionary spending: Restaurant traffic has declined significantly, including in Moscow, consistent with anecdotal reports of Russians eating out less because of rising costs.

Russians are increasingly pessimistic about the future. According to VTsIOM polling in July, 66 percent said the most difficult times were still ahead, up from 60 percent in May, while only 13 percent believed the worst had already passed. This economic anxiety is also showing up in household financial behavior: Russians withdrew billions of dollars from banks this summer amid growing fears that the Kremlin could restrict access to or seize deposits to help finance the war. Although economic conditions remain far from crisis levels, the economic benefits that helped cushion Russians from the costs of the war in its first several years are eroding.

The departure of large numbers of Russians opposed to the war continues to support regime stability, although there has been little discernible change in this pillar. Concerns about another large-scale mobilization have generally abated, limiting the impetus for another mass exodus like that of 2022. Nonetheless, renewed mobilization fears this summer prompted a sharp increase in Russians exploring their exit options, particularly to Georgia and Armenia. Since the 2022 mobilization, the Kremlin has also systematically closed loopholes that allowed Russians to evade the draft, including through electronic summonses that can trigger restrictions on foreign travel. Overall, however, the political effect remains largely unchanged: Many of the Russians most likely to oppose the war have already left the country, while the regime is increasingly well positioned to constrain future outflows should another mobilization become necessary.

The Russian military remains largely apolitical. The Kremlin continues to prevent commanders from developing independent political constituencies. Turnover among senior commanders has accelerated, with military district commanders now serving only about one year on average. This churn makes it harder for commanders to build independent bases of support within the military. The Kremlin also appears to recognize that the eventual return of large numbers of veterans could create a new source of political influence and is carefully managing their integration into government and politics through its “Time of Heroes” program. Thus far, four years of war have not produced a politically autonomous military constituency capable of challenging Putin.

There are no significant indications that Russia’s security services are becoming less loyal to Putin, but their capacity is coming under growing strain. Russia’s Interior Ministry reported a staffing shortfall of more than 200,000 personnel in 2025, with particularly acute shortages among district and patrol police. The wartime economy has exacerbated these shortages, as higher salaries in the defense industry and other sectors have made poorly paid police work increasingly unattractive. An increasingly overstretched police force could make it harder to respond effectively to localized unrest and raises the risk that overreaction to small incidents could more easily escalate. These shortages could become more consequential as large numbers of veterans return from the war, potentially increasing crime rates and therefore placing additional demands on an already strained police force.

Rumors also abound about a possible change at the top of the Interior Ministry. Similarly, it has been rumored for years that Putin’s longtime associate Aleksander Bortnikov may retire as head of the powerful Federal Security Service, which could lead to friction among the various departments inside the FSB that frequently compete with each other for resources and influence.

In the last stability tracker, Putin’s approval rating stood at or above 80 percent. Putin’s popularity has weakened modestly, although it remains an important pillar of regime stability. VTsIOM recorded the sharpest weekly decline in Putin’s approval since the full-scale invasion in late June, when his approval fell from 70.4 percent to 66.9 percent; by early July it had fallen further to 66 percent. Levada has recorded a more modest decline, with Putin’s approval falling from 79 percent in May to 74 percent in June and remaining at that level in July. The decline appears to reflect a combination of war fatigue, worsening economic conditions, and the growing disruption caused by Ukrainian strikes and associated internet shutdowns.

Even as his stated approval ratings remain high, this support appears passive rather than enthusiastic. Most Russians continue to favor negotiations to end the war, and there are few outward displays of support for the regime.

Repression remains a critical pillar of regime stability. The Kremlin has especially taken to punishing individuals who challenge its preferred narratives. In August, Andrei Klepach, the chief economist at state development corporation VEB.RF, was fired after publicly warning that Russia could not win a prolonged economic war of attrition. The regime has been harsher toward political dissent: Yabloko deputy chairs Lev Shlosberg and Maxim Kruglov received prison sentences of 11 and seven years, respectively, while prominent children’s hospice founder Lida Moniava was detained in September over her criticism of the war. Such cases signal the regime’s willingness to punish those who oppose it, encouraging self-censorship.

The Kremlin continues to benefit from portraying Russia as a besieged fortress confronting hostile external powers. Europe has increasingly replaced the United States as the principal antagonist in this narrative, with Russians now identifying Germany as the country most hostile to Russia. Britain, Poland, France, and the Baltic states also ranked prominently.

The effect of Ukrainian strikes on regime stability is more unclear. There is some evidence that major Ukrainian attacks initially generate a rally-around-the-flag response, and even Russians living in regions most exposed to the war have not turned decisively against the Kremlin. But as strikes increasingly produce costs, they may also contribute to anxiety and war fatigue. For now, the Kremlin continues to benefit from portraying these attacks as evidence that Russia is under siege, but the longer-term effect may depend on whether Russians come to hold their own government responsible for failing to prevent them.