October 14, 2025

Export Controls and U.S. Trade Policy: Making Sense of the New Terrain

By: Geoffrey Gertz and Thomas Krueger

This article was originally published in Just Security.

U.S. export controls are evolving from a narrow national security tool to a broader trade policy instrument, reflecting U.S. President Donald Trump’s willingness to blend economic and national security negotiations and such controls’ growing impact on economic growth, technological leadership, and geopolitical influence.Trade policy experts are now scrambling to learn the world of export controls, which were a key sticking point in a series of high-stakes trade negotiations this summer between U.S. and Chinese officials.

For the national security community, however, this shift may portend even more dramatic changes: deploying export controls as a multi-purpose instrument creates risks for core U.S. security interests, including the perception that national security can be traded away for commercial gain. To alleviate such risks, U.S. policymakers should clarify which national security export controls are not up for negotiation and reassure allies and the private sector that export control policy will be applied consistently and predictably.

If the administration wants to liberalize export controls to lower trade imbalances and as a carrot in trade negotiations, there are ways to do so without endangering U.S. national security.

To understand the shift currently underway, it is helpful to first review the traditional rationale and use cases of export controls. Export controls are statutory and regulatory measures designed to restrict the transfer of certain goods, technologies, and services across national borders. The United States has primarily used export controls to prevent strategic competitors from acquiring dual-use technologies, curtail the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), sanction foreign states or entities, and support human rights by blocking the transfer of tools and technologies that could facilitate surveillance or repression.

Traditional export controls advanced national security in significant ways. For example, the Missile Technology Control Regime ensured that participating states did not transfer advanced technologies such as ballistic missiles and long-range unmanned aerial vehicles abroad unless the transfers were first reviewed and approved by their governments. The Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australia Group track emerging products that have potential nuclear and chemical weapons applications, respectively. When warranted, they place these items on control lists to guide government export regulations. Similarly, the Wassenaar Arrangement seeks to control emerging dual-use technologies, such as advanced semiconductors and quantum technologies. However, the effectiveness of these regimes has been undermined in recent years, as Russia has begun blocking proposals for typically agreed-upon controls.

Read the full article in Just Security.

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