December 11, 2025

Short Supply

Identifying and Addressing the Root Causes of Declining Propensity for Military Service

By: Katherine L. Kuzminski and Taren Sylvester

Executive Summary

The U.S. military faces a critical challenge: Fewer young Americans are willing to serve, and fewer adults are encouraging them to do so. Because of deliberate policy choices by the leadership of two administrations in fiscal years 2024 and 2025, recruitment improved. Despite this good news, two fundamental threats loom: a projected 13 percent decline in Americans turning 18 between 2025 and 2041, and a long-term drop in propensity to serve—from 16 percent of youth in 2003 to 10 percent in 2022.

This study captures findings from quantitative analysis of publicly available government data; the existing body of survey data regarding trust in institutions; novel data from a survey conducted by the Center for a New American Security and YouGov in January 2025; interviews with policymakers, congressional staff, and uniformed leaders; and an expert workshop convened in February 2025.

The decline in propensity reflects deeper societal shifts beyond the Department of Defense’s control. Trust in American institutions has eroded over the past two decades. Confidence in the military among Americans fell from 82 percent in 2009 to 60 percent in 2023—mirroring declines across government, religious institutions, and civic organizations. Young people are simultaneously withdrawing from higher education, workforce education, and military service, signaling a broader disengagement from traditional pathways to adulthood and contributions to society.

The study’s key findings include:

Young Americans are disengaging from traditional pathways to adulthood.

Between 2017 and 2022, college enrollment dropped 9 percent, labor force participation among 20–24-year-olds fell from over 70 percent to the low 60s, and the propensity to serve in the military declined. The recruiting crisis is not isolated—it reflects generational patterns of reduced institutional engagement.

Exposure to military service drives recommendations to serve.

Survey data show that individuals closest to military service—service members, military families, veterans, and veterans’ families—are significantly more likely to recommend military service. However, the civil-military gap has widened as fewer Americans have direct connections to service members, shrinking the population of influential advocates.

Practical concerns outweigh ideological debates.

Adults cite fear of death or injury (72 percent), post-traumatic stress disorder (63 percent), and competing career interests (46 percent) as primary reasons for not recommending military service. Partisan debates about military personnel policies from both ends of the political spectrum, while generating attention, have limited explanatory power compared with these fundamental safety and opportunity concerns.

Mistrust in civilian leadership matters more than mistrust in uniformed leadership.

Declining confidence in the presidency and Congress—not in military leaders—most closely correlates with adults’ willingness to recommend military service. Veterans who question whether their deployments served credible national interests are less likely to encourage the next generation to serve.

The study’s recommendations target multiple levels of government and society:

The president should use public platforms to highlight military professionalism and performance, deploy forces responsibly with clear justifications, leverage initiatives such as the Presidential Fitness Test to increase both fitness and exposure to military service as a career option, and protect the military from partisan polarization.

The secretary of defense and the service secretaries should pilot pre-enlistment military exposure programs enabling candidates to experience military life prior to committing to service, establish public-facing recruitment performance dashboards, invest in quality-of-life improvements (particularly housing), maintain rigorous standards to both drive lethality and protect service members from undue injury or death, and embrace talent management systems that match individuals to roles based on knowledge, skills, attributes, performance, and preferences.

Congress should fund recruiting and quality-of-life improvements as strategic priorities rather than treating such expenditures as mere overhead, enforce stringent reporting requirements, and conduct mid-fiscal-year oversight hearings specifically focused on personnel and recruitment separate from required posture hearings.

State and local leaders should prioritize increasing exposure to those who have served across the civilian community by recognizing local service members, ensuring recruiter access to schools, and supporting military spouses and transitioning veterans through professional and occupational licensing reciprocity and employment assistance.

Introduction

The United States must fulfill its military manpower requirements annually to meet current and emerging threats, calibrating the accession of new recruits with the retention of current service members. As approximately 200,000 service members transition out of service each year, the services must actively recruit new enlistments to meet active-duty end strengths. The U.S. military struggled to meet recruitment goals in fiscal years (FYs) 2022 and 2023. Through deliberate changes in policy and practice spanning two administrations, the military services reversed this decline. However, two trends threaten continued progress: a sharp drop in the number of Americans turning 18 in the coming years (Figure 1) and a long-term decline in both young people’s propensity (or willingness) to serve in the military and adults’ willingness to recommend service to the young people in their lives.

Military recruitment requires individuals who possess two simultaneous attributes: eligibility and propensity. Eligibility involves meeting a range of service standards, including U.S. citizenship or permanent resident status, age requirements, a high school diploma or equivalent, a qualifying score on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test, and the ability to pass a medical exam and a physical fitness test. Currently, only 23 percent of American youth meet eligibility requirements, limiting the population that the military can access for service. Yet the low rate of eligibility for military service is only one challenging factor; not only do potential recruits need to meet the standards for service, but they also need to have an interest in serving, referred to as a propensity.

In FY 2022 and FY 2023, the Army missed its active-duty recruiting goals by 15,099 (25 percent) and 10,000 (15 percent), respectively—a return of challenges previously faced in FY 2018, when the Army missed its recruiting goals by 6,500 soldiers (15 percent). The Navy missed its targets for the first time in FY 2023, falling short by 7,000 recruits (18 percent), while the Air Force also missed its recruiting goals for the first time in more than 20 years in FY 2023. While meeting its recruiting goals, the Marine Corps had to rely more heavily on its Delayed Entry Program than in years past. The Space Force—the smallest service—has largely avoided recruitment challenges due to its reliance on interservice transfers.

By the end of FY 2024 and continuing into FY 2025, military recruitment improved across each of the services. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness actively worked and continue to work in concert with the services to identify where medical, academic, moral, and mental health care standards could be modernized while also accounting for additional operational risks associated with any such policy change. The services increased access to medical professionals to expedite the medical waiver process, which has become more cumbersome with the introduction of the Military Health System GENESIS electronic health care system in 2021. The services have further invested in identifying ways to professionalize and incentivize recruiters to better navigate the current challenges. The Army established the Future Soldier Prep Course in August 2022, aiding interested candidates in improving physical fitness and academic aptitude in order to meet Army standards, yielding 15,000 new soldiers in FY 2024. In June 2025, the Pentagon announced the establishment of a 12-month Recruitment Task Force intended to “translate this year’s [FY 2025] momentum into an enduring advantage.”

Despite these improvements, the nation is facing a demographic shift that will shrink the pool of young Americans reaching military service age. Between 2025 and 2041, the number of children turning 18 is projected to decline by 13 percent, primarily due to lower birth rates after the Great Recession that began in 2008. Furthermore, the Pentagon’s acknowledgment of a nearly 40 percent decline in propensity to serve—a trend that continues even amid the recruiting improvements seen through September 2025—signals potential future challenges for military recruitment.

Yet the low rate of eligibility for military service is only one challenging factor; not only do potential recruits need to meet the standards for service, but they also need to have an interest in serving, referred to as a propensity.

American propensity for military service, as measured by the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) Joint Advertising Market Research and Studies (JAMRS) annual Youth Poll (surveying youth ages 16 through 21), declined from a recent high of 16 percent in November 2003 to the current low of 10 percent in the spring of 2022. JAMRS surveys further found that those with the ability to influence decision-making—fathers, mothers, grandparents, and other engaged adults—were all less likely to recommend military service in 2021 than they were in 2003.

Larger, unanswered questions remain regarding the root causes of the decline in American propensity to serve in the military or to recommend or support others’ interest in military service. The decline in propensity for military service may have greater explanatory power for the current recruiting challenges than the proportion of American youth eligible for military service. While it is true that the services are currently wrestling with the low percentage of youth eligibility for military service, youth eligibility rates in 2023 reflected the same eligibility rates as those from FY 2013. Yet in previous years, even with a low percentage of youth eligible to serve in the military, the military services were able to meet their recruiting goals because propensity was sufficiently high.

The reduced propensity reflects a shift in attitudes toward the value of military service driven by factors well beyond the purview of the DoD and the services. Societal attitudes toward military service are likely affected by a range of independent and interacting variables, including historically low unemployment rates, changes in labor force participation, societal expectations regarding university attendance, preferences among the recruitable population, the competitive evolution of benefits among civilian employers, shifting trends in parenting behavior and expectations, the impact of the post-9/11 wars and their outcomes, and declining trust and participation in institutions. Most of these factors fall beyond the control of the DoD and the military services. Except for unemployment rates, the relationship between these factors and rates of propensity for military service remain understudied.

The decline in propensity for military service may have greater explanatory power for the current recruiting challenges than the proportion of American youth eligible for military service.

While the DoD and the military services have a role to play in driving propensity—for example, ensuring that the American public is educated about and exposed to opportunities for military service—changes in trends regarding propensity toward military service reflect broader changes at a societal level. Shifts in trust in institutions, debates surrounding the execution of and withdrawal from the post-9/11 wars, changing attitudes regarding the necessity of college attendance, shifting dynamics in workforce participation, and changing attitudes about individual versus collective responsibilities all impact the perception of military service as a viable and desirable career path for American youth. Yet to date, no comprehensive root cause analysis of the decline in propensity for military service has been conducted.

This report synthesizes mixed-methods analysis and findings of a yearlong study on the root causes of the decline in propensity to serve in the military or recommend military service to eligible young Americans. The study analyzed relevant quantitative data, including data from DoD JAMRS surveys, the U.S. Census Bureau, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the Federal Reserve. The research team analyzed military end strengths since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973 and military pay over time from DoD budget requests. The team further analyzed survey data provided by military community organizations to identify trends in how likely service members, spouses, and military families were to recommend service to others.

The research team further identified and analyzed existing survey data regarding trust in institutions to identify trends over time. However, limited survey data existed linking elements of trust in institutions to the likelihood that adults would recommend military service to the young people in their lives. To link these two bodies of survey research—trust in institutions and likelihood of recommending military service—the research team collaborated with YouGov to field a representative survey of 2,500 American adults. The survey was fielded between January 2 and January 15, 2025. The time frame was notable as it occurred after the 2024 presidential election but before Inauguration Day 2025, representing a period of transition.

The research team conducted interviews with defense leaders (including uniformed officers, senior noncommissioned officers, and civilian political appointees) and congressional committee professional staff members. The research team further interviewed a wide range of experts, including those focused on demography, workforce and employment, higher education, and military marketing and advertising. The research team identified and convened a group of 33 practitioners and experts on military recruitment, sociology, demography, employment, and civic engagement for a one-day expert elicitation workshop on February 19, 2025. The workshop also included active-duty, Reserve, and National Guard service members and both officer and enlisted perspectives. The workshop’s purpose was to identify structured areas of consensus across the group of handpicked experts, supplementing and contextualizing findings from individual interviews.

Road Map and Scope of the Report

The report provides a background on military manpower requirements and military recruitment from the inception of the American AVF in 1973 through the end of FY 2025. The report then outlines root causes of the decline in propensity for military service or recommending military service identified over the course of the study through data analysis, survey findings, and expert feedback. The report closes with recommendations for key players across government and American society. The appendix provides the survey instrument.

While the decline in propensity for military service affects all three components of the military—the active duty, the Reserves, and the National Guard—this report focuses on the impact of the decline in propensity on the active-duty force to meet its manpower requirements. Though this report does not address the challenges specific to reserve component propensity, Reserve and Guard perspectives were included in interviews, the survey, and the expert elicitation exercise.

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  1. Projections derived from U.S. Centers for Disease Control National Center for Health Statistics, “Birth Data,” https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/births.htm; Spring 2022 Propensity Update (Department of Defense Joint Advertising Market Research and Studies, February 23, 2023), https://jamrs.defense.gov/Portals/20/Documents/YP52Spring2022PUBLICRELEASEPropensityUpdate.pdf; and remarks by chief Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell, “Chief Pentagon Spokesman Sean Parnell Holds Press Briefing,” Department of Defense, July 2, 2025, https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4234712/chief-pentagon-spokesman-sean-parnell-holds-press-briefing/. ↩
  2. “Confidence in Institutions,” Gallup, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx. ↩
  3. Nicholas Eberstadt, “Men Without Work,” American Enterprise Institute, January 30, 2018, https://www.aei.org/articles/men-without-work-2/; Karin Fischer, “The Shrinking of Higher Ed,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, August 12, 2022, https://www.chronicle.com/article/the-shrinking-of-higher-ed. ↩
  4. National Student Clearinghouse Research Center, “Current Term Enrollment Estimates (CTEE) Expanded Edition, Fall 2022 Enrollment Overview,” 2022, https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/researchcenter/viz/CTEE_Fall2022_Report/CTEEFalldashboard; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “Labor Force Participation Rate—20–24 Years,” https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LNS11300036. ↩
  5. Public Release Fall 2024 Propensity Update: Youth Poll Study Findings (Department of Defense Office of People Analytics, July 18, 2025), https://jamrs.defense.gov/Portals/20/Documents/YP60Fall2024PUBLICRELEASEPropensityUpdate_20250623_Briefing.pdf?ver=BGMlqqZ16fcvOuEPrnBZaQ%3D%3D. ↩
  6. Kristy Kamarck, Military Transition Assistance Program (TAP): Background and Issues for Congress, R48114 (Congressional Research Service, June 27, 2024), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48114. ↩
  7. “Requirements to Join the U.S. Military,” USA.gov, https://www.usa.gov/military-requirements. ↩
  8. Jim Garamone, “After Tough Year, Military Recruiting Is Looking Up,” DOD News, December 22, 2023, https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3625464/after-tough-year-military-recruiting-is-looking-up/. ↩
  9. Michael Pollard et al., Identifying Opportunities to Recruit More Individuals Above the Age of 21 into the U.S. Army (RAND, 2022), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA824-1.html; U.S. Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Announces Recruiting and Retention Numbers for Fiscal Year 2022,” press release, September 30, 2022, https://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/MRA_Docs/MPP/pressreleases/2022/Press%20Release%20September%202022%20-%20FY%202022.pdf. ↩
  10. Diana Stancy, “Navy Misses Active Duty, Reserve Recruiting Goals for 2023,” Navy Times, October 10, 2023, https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2023/10/10/navy-misses-active-duty-reserve-recruiting-goals-for-2023/; Rachel S. Cohen, “Entire Air Force to Miss Recruiting Goal, the First Failure Since 1999,” Air Force Times, September 14, 2023, http://airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2023/09/14/entire-air-force-to-miss-recruiting-goal-the-first-failure-since-1999/. ↩
  11. Rachel S. Cohen, “Air Force Recruiting Rebounds While Army, Navy Still Struggle,” Air Force Times, February 16, 2024, https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2024/02/17/air-force-recruiting-rebounds-while-army-navy-still-struggle/. ↩
  12. Garamone, “After Tough Year, Military Recruiting Is Looking Up.” ↩
  13. Irene Loewenson and Geoff Ziezulewicz, “The ‘Genesis’ of Today’s Recruiting Crisis: A New System and Old Medical Records Are Slowing the Influx of Volunteers, Recruiters Say,” Military Times, April 10, 2023, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2023/04/10/the-genesis-of-todays-recruiting-crisis/. ↩
  14. Shannon Collins, “Army Details Five Ways to Bring Recruiting into 21st Century,” Army News Service, October 10, 2023, https://www.army.mil/article/270692/army_details_five_ways_to_bring_recruiting_into_21st_century. ↩
  15. Lolita Baldor, “The Army’s Answer to a Lack of Recruits Is a Prep Course to Boost Low Scores. It’s Working,” The Associated Press, November 10, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/army-recruits-prep-course-soldiers-e161c892b92138999b01ae5ea6650b92. ↩
  16. West Shinego, “Recruitment Task Force Seeks to Capitalize on 2025 Enlistment Surge,” DOD News, July 2, 2025, https://www.army.mil/article/286799/recruitment_task_force_seeks_to_capitalize_on_2025_enlistment_surge. ↩
  17. Patrick Lane, Colleen Falkenstern, and Peace Bransberger, Knocking at the College Door: Projections of High School Graduates (Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, 2024), https://www.wiche.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/2024-Knocking-at-the-College-Door-final.pdf. ↩
  18. Remarks by chief Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell, “Chief Pentagon Spokesman Sean Parnell Holds Press Briefing.” ↩
  19. Spring 2022 Propensity Update. ↩
  20. Influencer Poll Wave 74, (Department of Defense Joint Advertising Market Research and Studies, May 6, 2022), https://jamrs.defense.gov/Portals/20/Documents/22-S-1693%20cleared%20InfluencerPollW74-PublicRelease.pdf. ↩
  21. Thomas Novelly, “Even More Young Americans Are Unfit to Serve, a New Study Finds. Here’s Why,” Military.com, September 28, 2022, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2022/09/28/new-pentagon-study-shows-77-of-young-americans-are-ineligible-military-service.html. The DoD reported that youth eligibility had declined from a high of 29 percent of eligible American youth in FY 2017 to 23 percent in 2022. However, reporting from the U.S. Army Recruiting Command in May 2013 stated that only 23 percent of American youth met eligibility standards for military service that year. See United States Army Recruiting Command, USAREC May 2013 Talking Points, May 6, 2013. ↩
  22. Military Family Lifestyle Survey: Strengthening Military Families Amid Global Challenges (Blue Star Families, 2024), https://bluestarfam.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/BSF_MFLS24_Comp_Report_Full-v2.pdf. ↩
  23. Mohamed Younis, “Confidence in U.S. Military Lowest in Over Two Decades,” Gallup, July 31, 2023, https://news.gallup.com/poll/509189/confidence-military-lowest-two-decades.aspx; From Businesses and Banks to Colleges and Churches: Americans’ Views of U.S. Institutions (Pew Research Center, February 2024), https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2024/02/PP_2024.02.01_institutions_REPORT.pdf. ↩

Authors

  • Katherine L. Kuzminski

    Director of Studies

    Katherine Kuzminski is the director of studies at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), where she is responsible for managing the Center’s research agenda, publicatio...

  • Taren Sylvester

    Former Research Assistant, National Security Human Capital Program

    Taren Sylvester is a former research assistant for the National Security Human Capital Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Their research interests inclu...

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