The Ever-Changing, Unchanged Defense Acquisition System

Introduction

The defense acquisition system has been and continues to be in a period of great change, both in terms of the laws and processes that govern it and the private sector ecosystem that supports it. Even so, policymakers in both Congress and the executive branch continue to be dissatisfied with the results. The aim of this series is to understand why these changes have not satisfied the overseers of defense acquisition and what these policymakers should do about it. This essay series will explore themes in the current state of defense acquisition such as industrial policy, the influx of private capital into the defense industry, developments in advanced manufacturing, and workforce issues. Authors include expert practitioners writing from many different perspectives, including policymakers, defense industry practitioners, new entrants into the defense sector, and venture capitalists. This introductory essay will focus on efforts to reform the defense acquisition system and why both Congress and the executive branch remain unsatisfied with the results.

Key Takeaways

• The defense acquisition system has been in a near-constant state of reform for the past several decades, yet broad dissatisfaction in both the legislative and executive branches with how the Department of Defense (DoD) procures weapon systems persists.
• This state of affairs suggests that the problem is perhaps not with the process, but with its content and execution.
• By extension, a solution may be accepting that the process is good enough and focusing more on day-to-day execution.

The More Things Change ...

The defense acquisition system has been in a near-constant state of reform for the past several decades. This observation is not novel; the author wrote about it back in 2019. Since then, both Congress, through the FoRGED and SPEED Acts, and the second Trump administration, have engaged in further rounds of defense acquisition reform.

At the same time, private actors are shaking up the defense acquisition ecosystem. Venture capitalists invested a record $19 billion in defense and aerospace companies in 2025. Multimillion-dollar decisions to invest in new defense technology are now being made by private individuals and entities, sometimes with very little consultation with the ultimate customers in the Department of Defense. While developing new weapon systems without government involvement is one way to speed up the process, it remains to be seen whether this approach will yield the kinds of systems that the joint force needs, or in forms that can be integrated into the extant force.

... The More They Stay the Same ...

As this state of continuous reform demonstrates, broad dissatisfaction among both legislators and executive branch officials with the DoD’s ability to procure new weapon systems persists. The iron triangle of any capital project remains a reality for defense procurement; tradeoffs must be made among speed, cost, and quality. The reforms of the 2000s focused primarily on reigning in cost and schedule, and they were successful in doing so, as measured by the average number of Nunn-McCurdy breaches per year before and after the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, for example.

The latest slate of reforms appears to prioritize improving speed, though there is little acknowledgment in either the executive or legislative branches that compromises will have to be made on cost and/or quality to achieve that objective. It is thus likely that this never-ending state of constant reform will continue, as successive waves of policymakers attempt to turn the dial on one side of the iron triangle and inevitably sacrifice some other aspect of program performance. Meanwhile, defense acquisition professionals continue to devote time and attention to rearranging org charts and process diagrams, rather than executing their programs.

... But What Really Matters Is Execution.

Process is “an empty vessel.” Empty vessels are essential; without them we would have nothing to contain our coffee, for example. However, bad coffee in a perfect cup is still a bad cup of coffee. Conversely, perfect coffee in a mediocre cup is still pretty good. Likewise, a perfect defense acquisition process will not yield the desired results unless the content of that process is also solid, and a process that is good enough can still produce a satisfactory result.

The last several decades of acquisition reform have been focused primarily on the cup (process) and less on the coffee (content and execution). Worse than that, requiring the people responsible for defense acquisition to devote copious amounts of time and attention to continuous reorganization and process reform has harmed their ability to efficiently acquire defense materiel.

It is extraordinarily tempting for policymakers in both the executive and legislative branches to continue to noodle on process. Process changes can be easily captured in statute or regulation and drawn neatly as wiring diagrams. On the other hand, it is very difficult to direct better execution. This is where organizational culture comes into play, with tricky challenges like incentivizing humans to take the right kinds of risks, providing them with the agency required to do their jobs effectively while also retaining enough oversight to provide top cover when some stakeholder is invariably upset with the outcome, and to guard against poor outcomes.

In other words, it’s the quotidian, grinding work of empowered defense acquisition professionals with effective and engaged management that will ultimately improve the DoD’s ability to acquire weapon systems. There is no replacement for rigorous attention to strong contracting practices, realistic schedules and cost estimates, and more frequent assessment of where it might make sense to trade capability for speed (or vice versa) on a case-by-case basis. There is also no substitute for time spent engaging with actors in the defense industrial base, both defense primes and new entrants, as well as those who provide their funding. It is precisely this kind of work that is hampered by never-ending rounds of “reform.”

Recommendations

• Congress and the DoD should stop “reforming” acquisition processes and reorganizing offices that acquire defense materiel. What exists is an adequate container for the content of good defense acquisition.
• Instead, they should focus leadership time and attention on the content of what the DoD is buying (i.e., where is it appropriate to trade speed for capability or vice versa) and how the DoD is buying it (e.g., realistic schedules and cost estimates, strong contracting practices).

Conclusion

The aim of defense acquisition should be a process that is good enough to get the job done with a relentless focus on the content—the hard government work of execution. Shifting focus will require a change in the way the DoD does business, but not one that is easily captured in a new regulation or org chart. And it can only happen if the defense acquisition enterprise is given a reprieve from reforming itself so that it can get down to business.

About the Author

The Honorable Susanna V. Blume is a distinguished senior fellow with the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security. She previously served as the Department of Defense’s director for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE).

About the New American Industrial Base Essay Series

This essay series, The New American Industrial Base, features expert practitioners with experience in government, industry, and finance writing on the most pressing challenges in defense acquisition today. For more in this series, click here.

About the Center for a New American Security

As a research and policy institution committed to the highest standards of organizational, intellectual, and personal integrity, CNAS maintains strict intellectual independence and sole editorial direction and control over its ideas, projects, publications, events, and other research activities. CNAS does not take institutional positions on policy issues, and the content of CNAS publications reflects the views of their authors alone. In keeping with its mission and values, CNAS does not engage in lobbying activity and complies fully with all applicable federal, state, and local laws. CNAS will not engage in any representational activities or advocacy on behalf of any entities or interests and, to the extent that the Center accepts funding from non-U.S. sources, its activities will be limited to bona fide scholastic, academic, and research-related activities, consistent with applicable federal law. The Center publicly acknowledges on its website annually all donors who contribute.